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BANKING IN THE DIGITAL AGE – WHO IS AFRAID 
OF PAYMENT 
DISINTERMEDIATION? 
By 
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Osgoode Hall Law School York University, Toronto, Canada 
Counsel, Torys LLP Toronto 
E-mail: bgeva@osgoode.yorku.ca 
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Abstract 
Throughout the ages, banks have evolved as intermediaries taking deposits of funds, lending money, and 
providing payment services. In the process they became also suppliers of commercial bank money, now 
only in the form of bank deposits. Following a historical review as to how moneychangers and goldsmiths 
became bankers, the paper points out that money and payment digitization has brought some challenges 
to the traditional role of banks as intermediaries. First, the digital age is about to facilitate the 
availability of central bank money balances or their equivalent to the public. Second, cryptocurrencies 
and blockchains were born. Third, claim-check centralized digital currencies have been created. This 
paper argues that availability to the public of central bank money, in the form of either full-reserve 
banking or plain sovereign money, is unlikely to affect the role of banks other than in money creation. 
The paper goes on to argue that cryptocurrencies are mostly not a new form of money and that in essence 
blockchains do not pose a major threat to the traditional interbank settlement system; at most they spur 
improvements in legacy systems. Finally, the argument goes, the creation of claim-check centralized 
digital currencies will give banks enough space to continue their role in providing payment services and 
even create alternative currencies fully backed by fiat ones. Ultimately banks will retain their role as 
intermediaries; Fintech does not have a payment services model which will supersede banking so that, in 
order to competitively provide payment services, IT firms will have to become banks.  
                                                          
*
 For research assistance in the final preparation of the manuscript I am grateful to Damian Lu, of the 2019 
graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law School. Any error and technology misunderstanding is exclusively of the 
author who acknowledges lack of computer science and engineering background. 
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I. Introduction 
 The essence of commercial banking has been the taking of deposits (or other repayable 
funds) from the public and lending.1 Linked to these functions is the provision of payment 
services.  
Accordingly,  
To be recognized as a bank … an institution is expected [i] to receive deposits of 
money from its customers; [ii] to maintain current accounts for them; [iii] to 
provide advances in the forms of loans or overdrafts; and [iv] to manage payments 
on behalf of its customers by collecting and paying cheques, bills, and other forms 
of ‘bank currency’2 
Historically, commercial banking (banking) emerged as a form of financial 
intermediation between savers (depositors) and borrowers. The banker (or bank)3 took from the 
public deposits either in specie or in commodity money; what was deposited was both owed by 
the banker to the depositors and at least in part available to be lent by the banker to borrowers. 
Loans were mostly credited into borrowers’ deposit accounts with the lending bankers in part to 
be used by borrowers to make payments. In this environment, payment intermediation in the 
form of non-cash payment services evolved as an outgrowth of deposit taking or, more in 
general, of maintaining deposit accounts for customers, whether the original depositors, or the 
borrowers who deposited the proceeds of the loan.4 This business model has been workable as 
long as not all depositors required payment in specie from the banker at the same time. In normal 
circumstances, it sufficed for a banker to keep at hand enough specie or cash to satisfy 
reasonable demand. Monitoring depositors’ payment activity in accounts facilitated credit 
decision-making and led to specialization in advancing information-intensive non-traded loans, 
                                                          
1
 See e.g. definition of ‘credit institution’ in Article 4(1)(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment 
firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32013R0575, accessed December 22, 2017. 
 
2
 Edwin Green, Banking: An Illustrated History (New York: Rizoli, 1989) at 11. For a similar judicial discussion on 
the characteristics of banking see Lord Denning MR judgement in United Dominion Trust v. Kirkwood [1966] 2 QB 
31 (CA) at 445-447.  
  
3
 Grammatically, ’banker’ is the professional individual, while ‘bank’ is the institution. Until incorporation, there 
was no real difference and this paper will use to the two terms interchangeably. Note also that ‘commercial 
banking’, ‘banking’, and ‘deposit banking’ are, generally speaking, synonyms, and unless indicated otherwise are 
used in this paper interchangeably.   
 
4
 See e.g.  Meir Kohn, “Early Deposit Banking” (February 1999) Department of Economics Darmouth College, 
Working Paper 99-03, online: <http://sites.dartmouth.edu/mkohn/files/2017/03/99-03.pdf>, accessed 9 January 
2018; and James McAndrews and William Roberds, “Payment Intermediation and the Origins of Banking” (August 
1999) Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper 99-11, online: 
<https://www.frbatlanta.org/research/publications/wp/1999/11.aspx>, accessed 9 January 2018. Both studies cover 
the Middle Ages and overlook Antiquity.  
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which became a principal niche for a profitable commercial banking business as well as effective 
financial intermediation for the economy as a whole. 
Already way back in Antiquity5 the evolution of mechanisms for payments initiated by 
the issue of payment orders had been part and parcel of the emergence of ‘banking’ as a form of 
financial intermediation between depositors to, and borrowers from, the depositary.6 
Furthermore, over centuries the architecture of the banking system evolved to satisfy the need to 
carry out noncash payment transactions between customers of separate banks by the creation of 
interbank networks. For its part, lending out of deposits meant a fractional reserve system which 
necessitated the establishment of liquidity facilities to ensure the smooth flow of payments. 
Finally, for their part, banknotes, of which at present mainly consists cash, originated as 
circulating receipts for deposited funds.   
 In the modern economy, payments are predominantly made by means of transfers 
through bank accounts, and otherwise the delivery of banknotes. As conduits of funds transfers, 
banks operate as intermediaries between payers and payees. They also distribute to their 
customers banknotes issued by the central bank. The recent emergence of digital currencies, 
facilitating payments outside the banking system, as well as in items not created throughout 
banking operations, has put to test these fundamentals and particularly challenged the 
architectural premises of the present banking system. This paper is designed to examine these 
challenges as well as the resilience of the banking system to meet them. Drawing on my previous 
work,7 Part II presents the evolution of deposit banking architecture throughout the ages 
facilitating both the intermediation of noncash payments through the banking system and the 
emergence of banknotes. Proceeding from another part of my earlier work,8 Part III addresses 
the impact of the cyber9 revolution in payments first in improving on the earlier paper-based 
system and then in challenging altogether its underlying architecture as well as the role of banks 
and bank products in providing payment services. The discussion examines the possible response 
by banks, their continued functions in a new era, as well as their adaptation to new demands, 
needs, and requirements. The particular challenges to be examined are in the broader context of 
                                                          
5
 Roughly speaking, Antiquity comes to an end with the beginning of the Middle Ages, usually marked by the fall of 
Rome in 476 CE. 
 
6
 For an insight into the process, though well into the later Medieval period, see e.g. Abbot Payson Usher, The Early 
History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe vol 1 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1943) 
particularly at 3-25.  
 
7
 Particularly Chapters 3, 8, and 10 of Benjamin Geva, The Payment Order of Antiquity and the Middle Ages: A 
Legal History (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2011).   
 
8
 In particular see Benjamin Geva, The Law of Electronic Funds Transfers (New York: Matthew Bender, Looseleaf 
updated to 2017) § 1.04[7] (of which an earlier version is the basis of Benjamin Geva, “Disintermediating Electronic 
Payments: Digital Cash and Virtual Currencies” (2016) 31: 12 J Intl Banking L & Reg); as well as Gene Neyer and 
Benjamin Geva, “Blockchain and Payment Systems—What are the Benefit and Costs” (2017) 11:3 Journal of 
Payments Strategy & System at 215. 
 
9
 ‘Cyber’ is used in this article to encompass both ‘electronic’ and ‘digital’.  
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possible payment disintermediation. They are first, the availability of central bank money 
balances or their equivalent to the public; second, cryptocurrencies and blockchains; and third, 
claim-check centralized digital currencies. In connection with each challenge the paper will 
assess the risks and the potential for adaptation for a new function where necessary under a new 
legal relationship.   
 I should stress that this paper does not argue that banks could or should stay complacent 
in the face of a quickening pace of technological upheaval. Rather, the argument is that 
‘banking’ embodies a model in which payment services are attached to deposit taking. As an 
activity undertaken in domestic as well as international networks, having evolved throughout 
history, banking has good odds of survival in the digital era. For sure, there are and will be new 
players, new methods as well as means of payment, and new regulations. Certainly, new 
regulatory schemes ought to cover new entrants as well as new products. But the relative 
advantage of providing ‘storage’ of, or at least access to, monetary value, side by side with 
institutional network linkages, are invaluable assets that are likely to continue to give an edge to 
banks. True, in an environment where everything moves quickly, it may even be necessary for 
banks to run faster in order to stay in same place.  However, in the final analysis, this is what 
they have already done throughout the ages, and are bound to keep doing, in fulfilling their 
important financial and payment intermediation functions.    
II. Deposit banking, payment services, and paper money: Historical perspective on 
payments intermediation 
The modern payment system has been described to consist of “a complex set of 
arrangements involving such diverse institutions as currency, the banking system, clearing 
houses, the central bank, and government deposit insurance.”10 The latter element is helpful but 
not universally present; and yet all are components of what can be broadly described as a 
commercial (deposit) banking system.  
Notwithstanding the substantial enhancement in complexity and importance of banking in 
the modern economy, its fundamentals are not at all novel.11  What follows is an abbreviated 
account of the evolution of payment intermediation, and to a lesser extent that of paper money in 
the form of cash, as an outgrowth of deposit banking. 
 
 
                                                          
10
 MS Goodfriend, “Money, Credit, Banking, and Payment System Policy”, in David B Humphrey, The US Payment 
System: Efficiency, Risk and the Role of the Federal Reserve (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990) at 247.  
 
11
 But cf. William Linn Westermann, “Warehousing and Trapezite Banking in Antiquity” (1951) 3 Journal of 
Economic and Business History 30 at 31 who highlights “a sound contrast between the relatively simple services 
rendered by the bank and the banker in antiquity … and the commanding position and complex character of banking 
as a function of credit in the economic system of today.” No doubt, such a contrast really exists, and yet it is not on 
point in tracing the roots of the modern bank to its predecessor in Ancient Greece. 
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(i) Antiquity 
 
Ancient Mesopotamia has been identified as the cradle of banking operations.12  It earned 
this title due to the emergence of institutions providing all core banking activities, namely, 
deposit taking, lending13  and payment services even prior to the emergence of ‘monetized’ 
coins.14 However, this was a secondary activity for such institutions; moreover, credit was made 
available by depositaries out of their own capital15  and without dipping into deposits. 16 As well, 
each customer’s deposit may have been physically segregated.17 Finally, there appears to be 
neither evidence for the execution of non-cash payments from one account to another nor any 
trace of inter-institutional clearing and settlement. 
 
In turn, the emergence of the bank as a distinct type of institution took place in Ancient 
Greece.18 More specifically, the process took place in the Mediterranean territory on which 
                                                          
12
 Raymond Bogaert, Les Origines antiques de la banque de dépôt (Leyde: A. W. Sijthoff, 1966) at 129 [Bogaert, 
Les Origines]. Roughly speaking, at 41- 129, Bogaert surveys a period extending over 1500 years commencing at 
the end of the 21st century BC and covering the Ur III Empire (2112-2004 BCE), the Old Babylonian Period (2000-
1600 BCE) which included the reign of Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE), the Middle Assyrian and Middle Babylonian 
Periods (1200-750 BCE), and the Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian Kingdoms (745-539 BCE). Elsewhere in the 
book, at 43, Bogaert specifically discounts the existence of any comparable role to Pharaonic Egypt, the other 
Ancient Near Eastern civilization.  
13
 A complex system of lending is traced back in Mesopotamia to the first half of the 2nd millennium BCE. See in 
general, Katrien De Graefe, “Giving a Loan is Like Making Love…” in Koenraad Verboven, Katelijn Vandorpe & 
Véronique Chankowski, eds, Pistoi Dia Tèn Technèn-Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World: Studies in 
Honour of Raymond Bogaert (Leuven: Peeters, 2008) at 3 [Verboven et al., Ancient World]. 
 
14
  The earliest coins were struck in Lydia (a city-state in Asia Minor) around 700 BCE. This is the conclusion, 
confirming the conventional wisdom on the matter, of the thorough study by D. Kagan, “The Dates of the Earliest 
Coins” (1982) 86:3 Journal of Archeology 343. 
 
15
 Bogaert, Les Origines, supra note 12 at 174. 
 
16
 The gradual erosion during the first millennium BCE, culminating approximately at the first part of its second 
half, is noted by Francis Joannès, “Les activités bancaires en Babylonie” in Verboven et al., Ancient World, supra 
note 13 at 17, 19. The claim set out in Alexander Lipton and Alex “Sandy”  Pentland, “Breaking the Banks: New 
Financial Networks Could stop the Concentration of Wealth and Increase Participation in the Economy –But only If 
Handled with Care” (January 2018) 318:1 Scientific American 26 who identify the origins of fractional lending out 
of deposits “more than 5,000 years ago in the Mesopotamian city of Ur”  is supported by neither Joannès, ibid nor 
Bogaert, Les Origines, supra note 12 to whose expertise I prefer to defer. 
17
 Bogaert, Les Origines, note 12 at 59, 84 n.236, 99 and nn. 311-313 & text, supra.  
 
18
 The ensuing discussion draws on Raymond Bogaert, Banques et banquiers dans les cités grecques (Leyde: A.W. 
Sijthoff, 1968) at 50-60 and 331-345 [Bogaert, Banques et banquiers]; Bogaert, Les Origines, supra note 12 at 130-
158; Edward E Cohen, Athenian Economy and Society: A Banking Perspective (Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1992) at 8-11, 14-18, 62-66 and 111-121.  
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Ancient Greek civilization expanded,19 almost throughout the entire classical period of that 
civilization.20  
Thus, in the course of the 6th century BCE, shortly after the appearance of coined money 
as a medium of exchange in commercial transactions,21 money changing surfaced as a 
profession. Shortly thereafter, the moneychanger came to accept deposits of coined money, mix 
them,22 lend out of them, so as to gradually become a banker. A banker effectively kept a 
running account for each customer, posting to it each deposit and withdrawal.23 A withdrawal 
from a customer’s account could be made for the entire or part of a balance due on deposited 
money, either by the depositor himself, or by a designated payee (or on his behalf) in pursuance 
to the depositor’s instruction.  
For each payment to a designated payee, having received the payment order and being in 
possession of cover, the payer’s banker sent a note to the payee. Having made an appropriate 
entry on his books in the payee’s favour, the banker became accountable to the payee, regardless 
of whether the payee kept an account with that banker. A payee who did not have an account of 
the payer’s bank could demand payment in cash, or where the advice note issued by the banker 
was made out to the payee ‘or order’, the payee could appoint an agent, usually another banker, 
to come to the payer’s banker and claim on the payee’s behalf payment in cash over the counter. 
Alternatively, the payee’s banker may have been prepared to credit the payee’s account in 
advance, on the basis of the advice note issued to the payee by the payer’s banker and presented 
to the payee’s banker by the payee, and in anticipation of subsequent payment by the payer’s 
banker. Payment by payer’s banker to the payee’s banker could be effectuated either in coins, or 
                                                          
19
 Roughly speaking this territory covers Mainland Greece, Greek Islands (together roughly coinciding with the area 
of modern-day Greece), and the western coast of Asia Minor or Anatolia (the latter of which is part of modern-day 
Turkey).  
 
20
 The Classical Period is said to have lasted between 500 and 336 BCE. It was preceded by the Archaic Period 
(stretching from 750 to 500 BCE) and followed by the Hellenistic Period (taking place between 336 and 146 BCE). 
The latter commences with Alexander the Great (336 to 323 BCE) under whose reign Greek civilization extended 
eastwards where it met and mingled with Eastern civilization. For time periods in the history of Ancient Greece you 
may visit <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_ancient_Greece>, accessed 27 December 2017. 
 
21
. Both the production and use of coined money were expanded towards the end of the 6th and beginning of the 5th 
century BCE. See in general, Arthur R Burns, Money and Monetary Policy in Early Times (New York: A.M. Kelley, 
1965, reprint of 1927) at 43-45.  
 
 
22
 On the theory that the depositary thus became indebted for the amount of the deposit rather than to return it in 
specie, Bogaert, Banques et banquiers supra note 18 at 333 treats such a deposit as ‘irregular’ in the sense 
subsequently given to it by the Romans.  In the view of Cohen, supra note 18 at 112-113 this is however an 
anachronism.  
 
23
 On the evolution of accounting in Greece see e.g. Léopold Migeotte, “La compatabilité  publique dans les cités 
Grecques: l’exemple de Délos” in Verboven et al., Ancient World, supra note 13 at 59, and Véronique Chankowski, 
“Banquiers, caissiers, comptables. À propos des méthodes financières dans les comptes de Délos” in Verboven et 
al., Ancient World, supra note 13 at 77.  
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as part of either bilateral or multilateral setoff; and yet, neither an intercity nor an intra-city 
interbank clearing system, whether bilateral or multilateral, existed in Ancient Greece.24   
Compared to Ancient Greece, the institutional scene in Ancient Rome25 was more 
complex;26 and yet, this complexity did not lead to an overall advancement in banking practices. 
Nonetheless, in three major respects Roman banking practice went beyond that of the Greek. 
First, the receiver-banker could be treated as the first money transmitter, to whom funds are 
delivered with the view of making a specific payment. However, money transmission by a 
receiver-banker may have developed under narrow circumstances, in the context of private 
auctions, 27 and in any event did not extend to cover payment between geographically distant 
parties. Second, as in Ancient Greece, there was in Ancient Rome neither an intra-city  nor 
intercity multilateral interbank clearing and settlement system.28 However, nascent interbank 
correspondent arrangements, under which one bank held funds in an account with the other, 
developed, particularly in the same city,29  but also in different cities so as to facilitate payments 
                                                          
24
 Bogaert, Banques et banquiers supra note 18 at 344-345 and 413. 
 
25
 Between around 500 BCE and 30 CE the Roman Republic grew from a city state to dominate first Italy, then the 
Western Mediterranean and, finally, the entire Mediterranean basin. In the process, Rome had undergone a 
fundamental change in its system of government and came to be the Roman Empire. The City of Rome ultimately 
fell at 476 CE, an event which marks the end of the Roman period in the West. An outline of Roman history can be 
found, for example, at <http://www.forumromanum.org/history/>, accessed 28 December 2017.  In 320 CE Emperor 
Constantine chose Byzantium (present-day Istanbul) as the new capital of the Empire and renamed it 
Constantinopolis. He officially divided the Empire into an Eastern and Western Empires in 395 CE. The Eastern 
Empire survived for close to 1,000 years after the fall of Rome, until Constantinopolis fell to the hands of the 
Ottoman Turks in 1453 CE, except that particularly as of the rise of Islam at the 7th century CE it had been 
considerably weakened long before its ultimate fall. 
 
26
 For this institutional framework see e.g. Jean Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 30-49 [translated by Janet Lloyd] [Andreau, Banking] at 30-49; as well as 
Koenraad Verboven, “Faeneratores, Negotiatores, and Financial Intermediation in the Roman World (Late Republic 
and Early Empire)” in Verboven et al., Ancient World, supra note 13 at 211 [Verboven, “Faeneratores”]; and 
Koenraad Verboven, “The Sulpicii from Puteoli, argentarii or faeneratores?” in Pol Defosse, ed, Hommages à Carl 
Deroux; III –Histoire et épigraphie, Droit (Bruxelles: Éditions Latomus, 2003) at 429.  See also Peter Temin, 
“Financial Intermediation in the Early Roman Empire” (2004) 64.3 Journal of Economic History 705.   
  
27
 See in general, Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider, eds, Brill’s New Pauly Encyclopedia of the Ancient World: 
Antiquity, vol 2 (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2003) at 331 (v. “Auctiones”). See also G. Humbert, “Auctio”, in Charles 
Victor Daremberg and Edmond Saglio, eds, Dictionnaire Des Antiquités Greques et Romaines vol 1, Part 1 (Graz: 
Akademische Durck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1969) at 543. For the controversy as to the role the banker played in a public 
auction see e.g. Fritz Sturm, “Stipulation argentaria” in Felix Bernard Joseph Wubbe & Johan Albert Ankum, 
Mélanges Felix Wubbe: offerts par ses collègues et ses amis à l’ocassion de son soixante-dixiéme anniversaire 
(Fribourg: Éditions universitaire, 1993) at 453, 460-63; Hans Ankum, “Quelques problèmes concernant les ventes 
aux enchères en droit romain classique”, Studi in onore di Gaetano Scherillo, vol 1, 377 (Milan: Cisalpino-La 
goliardica, 1972); and JAC Thomas, “The Auction in Roman Law” (1957) Juridical Review 42.  
 
28
 Notwithstanding Sam Maxwell, De la délégation en droit romain (Bordeaux: Imprimerie Ve Cadoret, 1895) at 
111. 
 
29
 See Andreau, Banking, supra note 26 at 43, who specifically claims that in the Roman world “[t]here was no 
system of institutionalized compensation between banks of the same city.” 
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between geographically distant parties.30 A non-cash payment could have been carried out 
between accounts of two depositors, either in the same bank, or in two banks situated in the same 
small town or within a specific market, whether permanent or periodic. 
 Third, deposit bankers operated under strict bookkeeping requirements, and were 
obligated to record their monetary operations in account books called rationes. An account book 
(ratio in singular) was also known as a ratio accepti et expensi (‘an account of deposits and 
payments’) and ratio implicita proper accepta et data (‘a complex account including both 
deposits and payments’). A deposit banker was required to make such books available for 
production in a trial involving a client, even where the deposit banker was not a party to the 
litigation.31 For his part, the deposit banker was obligated to maintain books, to account for the 
various entries, and to state a balance owed between himself and the customer.32 
Payment services were operated in conjunction with deposit banking in Greco-Roman 
Egypt.33 To begin with, public granaries in Greco-Roman Egypt, connected into a network of 
grain depositaries, operated a countrywide system of payment in agricultural products, such as 
oil and wine. Particularly however, they ran grain warehouse banking, facilitating payments out 
of and into deposits of grain, for both public authorities and individuals.34 The system maintained 
grain accounts and recorded transfers. For each yearly harvest of each type of grain the various 
deposits were physically amalgamated so that credit to an account reflected a claim to a share in 
                                                          
30
 See Jean G Platon, Les Banquiers dans la législation de Justinien (Premiére partie) (Paris: Librairie Recuil Sirey, 
1912) at 108-09. 
 
31
 See Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1953) 
at 366-367 (v. “Argentarii”). 
 
32
 Edmond Guillard, Les Banquiers Athéniens et Romains suivis du Pacte de Constitut en Droit Romain (Paris, 
Lyon: Guillaumin, H. Georg, 1875) at 52 sets out these obligations and discusses them at length in 52-79. 
 
33
 Following the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE, and after the ensuing partition of his empire, Egypt fell 
into Ptolemy’s hands. His successors, the Ptolemies, ruled Egypt until 30 BCE when the country was conquered by 
the Romans. With the partition of the Roman Empire in the course of the 4th century CE, the Byzantines succeeded 
the Romans; they stayed in power until 642 CE, when the Arabs took over and the Islamic epoch commenced. For 
Egypt, the entire era of close to a millennium, between Alexander the Great and the introduction of Islam, is loosely 
referred to as Greco-Roman. This historical sketch draws on <http://www.sis.gov.eg/section/0/701?lang=en-us>, 
accessed 27 December 2017, and <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_the_Great>, accessed 27 December 
2017. See also <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Empire>, accessed 27 December 2017, and 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim_conquests>, accessed 27 December 2017. 
34
 The system is concisely described by Claire Préaux, L’Économie royale des Lagides (Bruxelles: Édition de la 
Fondation Égyptogique, 1939) at 142, as well as by Michael Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the 
Hellenistic World, vol 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941) at 1287. See also Gyles Davies, A History of Money: from 
Ancient Times to Present Day, 3rd ed (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2002) at 52-55 and Westermann, supra 
note 11 at 32-33. The authoritative text relied by all is in German: Friedrich Preisigke, Girowesen im griechischen 
Ägypten (Strassburg: Verlad von Schlesier & Schweikhardt, 1910) [Reprinted: Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms 
Verlag, 1971], discussing the grain giro system at 62-184, particularly at 89-92, 101-102, and 128-130 (see also 
relevant translated documents reproduced at 147-173), in connection with which I had the benefit of a partial 
unofficial translation. 
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the mixture rather than to a physically segregated or separate deposit; it seems though, that no 
lending was made out of the mixture, so that full reserve was held to back all credits to the 
deposit accounts.35  
Book-based transfers could occur between accounts in the same granary, same region, or 
different regions. For an inter-granary transfer, an adjustment was made not only to transferor’s 
and transferee’s accounts, but also over a system of inter-granary accounts.36 A comprehensive 
account management system thus existed in each granary, in each region, as well as in 
Alexandria, from which the entire system was overseen. Effectively, this was the forerunner for a 
nationwide credit-push giro mechanism,37 under which payment orders were executed by means 
of crediting and debiting accounts.38  The system was however doomed to wither away together 
with the disappearance of specie and kind as universal mediums of exchange.39   
So far as the monetary economy of Greco-Roman Egypt40 was concerned, the banking 
system formed a network and assumed a key role in carrying out treasury operations for the 
                                                          
35
 For this understanding of the system (on the basis of Westermann’s article, supra note 11) see Jeffery Williams, 
“Fractional Reserve Banking in Grain” (1984) 16 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 488 at 488 n. 1.  
 
36
 For example, a transfer from a Depositor A in Granary A to a depositor B in Granary B, resulted not only in an 
adjustment of Depositors’ accounts, but also in an adjustment that reflected the claim of Granary B on Granary A 
where the grain in the amount of the transfer remained kept. 
 
37
 ‘Giro’ (coming from Greek 'gigros’, and meaning ring, circular or cyclical) usually narrowly denotes a ‘credit-
push’ mechanism for a non-cash payment between two accounts (as in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giro, accessed 
27 December 2017). Alternatively, it may more broadly denote any bookkeeping transfer (as in Westermann, supra 
note 11 at 49) or transfer operations (as in Rostovtzeff, supra note 34 at 1279). In this latter (broad) sense it is any 
non-cash payment between two bank accounts, regardless of whether it is a ‘credit-push’ or ‘debit-pull’ mechanism.   
 
38
 Possibly also, circulating credit notes attesting to credit posted to a grain account are said to have been used as 
payment devices. See e.g. Roger S Bagnall and Raymond Bogaert, “Orders for Payment from A Banker’s Archive: 
Papyri in the Collection of Florida State University” (1975), in Raymond Bogaert, Trapezitica Aegyptiaca: Recueil 
de recherches sur la banque en Égypte Gréco-Romaine (Firenze: Edizioni Gonelli, 1994) at 240 [Trapezitica]. No 
mention of such credit notes appears in Preisigke, supra note 34. 
 
39
 And yet, a temporary revival of grain banking, consisting also of lending out of amalgamated deposits, occurred in 
the Chicago in the course of the 19th century. See Williams, supra note 35. 
 
40
 Bogaert researched and wrote extensively on the subject. His work, consisting of 20 articles, mostly in French, to 
1994 (originally published elsewhere) is collated in Trapezitica, supra note 38. Six subsequent articles (which are 
thus not part of the collection) are Raymond Bogaert, "Liste géographic des banques et des banquiers de l'Égypte 
romaine, 30A-284” (1995) 109 Zeitschrift-für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 133; Raymond Bogaert, “La Banque en 
Égypte Byzantine” (1997) 116 Zeitschrift-fur Papyrologie und Epigraphik 85; Raymond Bogaert, “Les opérations 
des banques de l’Égypte Ptolémaïque” (1998) 29 Ancient Society 49; Raymond Bogaert, “Liste géographique des 
banques et des banquiers de l’Égypte Ptolémaïque” (1998) 120 Zeitschrift-für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 165; 
Raymond Bogaert, "Les opérations des banques de l’Égypte romaine" (2000) 30 Ancient Society 135; and Raymond 
Bogaert, “Les documents bancaires de l’Égypte Gréco-Romaine et Byzantine” (2001) 31 Ancient Society 173. 
Bogaert commenced the first of these last six articles ("Liste geographic” (1995), ibid at 133 text at n. 1) by 
conceding that for health reasons he had abandoned his plan to synthesize his extensive research on banks in Greco-
Roman Egypt into a monograph. Since then, he unfortunately passed away (in October 2009). A recent work 
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central government and other public authorities. Each regional royal bank operated in 
conjunction with a network of village banks, which effectively functioned as branch offices for 
royal banks or more precisely, as points of collections and disbursements of funds41 throughout 
the various districts of the country. However, the Royal Treasury, or the basilicon, in 
Alexandria,42 did not serve as a central bank;43 it neither maintained accounts for all deposits 
throughout the country, nor received surplus balances for such accounts, other than for the king. 
Nor did the basilicon oversee the operation of the entire network; it did not even maintain 
accounts for the various royal banks into which adjustments for inter-district transfers could be 
made. Rather, each royal bank kept a separate set of records for its own account holders. 
Effectively, together with its village bank network, a royal bank operated as a standalone 
independent bank. It follows that there was no infrastructure facilitating a countrywide system 
for inter-district non-cash payments from an account in one royal bank to an account in another. 
Throughout the Ptolemaic era,44 both royal and private banks maintained deposit 
accounts for individuals.45 Available documentation supports the existence of funds transfers 
from one account to another46  in private banks47 as well as for tax payments from accounts 
maintained in royal banks.48 Documentation further supports the existence of bilateral 
correspondent relations between private banks, namely instances where one bank holds an 
account with another.49At the same time, there is no indication of any multilateral bank clearing 
                                                          
covering the first part of the period is Sitta von Reden, Money in Ptolemaic Egypt: From the Macedonain Conquest 
to the End of the Third Century BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 257-296. 
41
 From a modern perspective, they were not ‘bank branches’ as, per explanation that immediately follows, they did 
not maintain on their books the principal accounts of their customers.  
 
42
 Bogaert’s tentative statement to that effect in Bogaert, “Le statut des banques en Égypte Ptolémaïque” (1981), 
Trapezitica, supra note 38 at 56 as well as in Bogaert, “Recherches sur la banque en Égypte Gréco-Romaine” 
(1987), Trapezitica, supra note 38 at 6 is expressed more confidently in Bogaert, “Les opérations des banques de l’ 
Égypte Ptolémaïque” supra note 40 at 117. 
 
43
 Among others, this has been a contested point. The present analysis follows Bogaert, who on this issue determined 
against the existence of a central bank in Alexandria. For his view on the point, in conjunction with a survey of the 
debate, see e.g. Bogaert, “Le statut des banques en Égypte Ptolémaïque” ibid at 47. 
  
44
 The Ptolemies, ruled Egypt following the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE until 30 BCE when the 
country was conquered by the Romans. See note 33 supra.   
 
45
 Bogaert, “Les opérations des banques de l’Égypte Ptolémaïque”, supra note 40, respectively at 113-116, 124-128, 
135-142. 
 
46
 Bogaert, ibid. 
 
47
 Bogaert, ibid at 136-137.   
 
48
 Bogaert, ibid at 115. 
 
49
 Bogaert, ibid at 135.   
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arrangement; and certainly, any claim to the existence in Greco-Roman Egypt of a “centralized 
state giro system”50 is not well founded.   
(ii) Middle Ages 
In West Europe, during the early centuries of the Middle Ages,51 the economy collapsed 
and trade was reduced to a trickle. Monetary economy survived only in a rudimentary form52 and 
banks disappeared from the West after the 4th century CE.53 Banking services reappeared in 
Europe in the later part of the Middle Ages to satisfy the growing demands of trade. “Genoa 
happens to preserve the earliest notarial minute books that have survived (from 1154 on) … 
[which] are the first source that contains a fairly large number of documents showing bankers at 
work.”54 Deposit banking, in the form of taking deposits and lending out of them in the 
depositary’s own name was reborn in Italy and ‘exported’ elsewhere55 in the course of the 12th 
and 13th centuries, as part of a commercial revolution that took place as of the 11th century or 
so.56  
As originally in Ancient Greece, it was the moneychanger who commenced to take 
deposits, mix them, and lend out of them. By 1350, in becoming bankers,57 moneychangers 
                                                          
50
 Davies, supra note 34 at 92. 
  
51
 The fall of Rome in 476 CE marks the end of Antiquity and the beginning of the Middle Ages. For Western 
Europe, the end of the Middle Ages is marked by the discovery of the New World in 1492, or perhaps slightly later, 
in the early 16th century, by the division of Western Christianity in the Reformation, the rise of humanism in the 
Italian Renaissance, and the beginnings of European overseas expansion. These propositions are common 
knowledge. See in general e.g. http://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_Ages, accessed 27 December 2017. 
 
52
  Robert S Lopez, “The Dawn of Medieval Banking”, in Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, University 
of California, Los Angeles, ed, The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1979) at 1, 3-5. For payments in kind assessed in monetary value and on occasion supplemented with low-value 
coins that took place in the Carolingian Empire (8th century CE), see e.g. Alexander Murray, Reason and Society in 
the Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, rep. 2002) at 31-35. 
 
53
 Bogaert, Les Origines, supra note 12 at 163-165. 
 
54
 Lopez, supra note 52 at 10. 
 
55
  See e.g. André-E Sayous, “Les opérations des banquiers Italiens en Italie et aux Foires de Champagne pendant le 
XIIIe siècle” (1932) 170 Revue Historique 1 [Sayous, “banquiers Italiens”]; and M. Prestwich, “Italian Merchants in 
Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Century England” in Centre for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, University 
of California, Los Angeles, ed, The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1979) at 77. 
 
56
 The revolution occurred in the aftermath of the feudal anarchy of the manorial economy of the Dark Ages. For a 
detailed discussion on this general context, see Raymond de Roover, “Chapter II: The Organization of Trade”, in 
MM Postan, EE Rich & E. Miller, eds, The Cambridge Economic History of Europe Volume 3: Economic 
Organization and Policies in the Middle Ages (London: Cambridge University Press, 1963, rep. 1979) at 42 [de 
Roover, “The Organization of Trade”]. 
 
57
 Raymond de Roover, “New Interpretations of the History of Banking”, in Julius Kirshner, ed, Business, Banking, 
and Economic Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Selected Studies of Raymond de Roover 
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developed a system of local payments by book transfers, with the view of eliminating “[t]he 
great inconvenience of making all payments in specie, especially the waste of time involved in 
counting coin.”58 The system that developed was strictly local; no facility for inter-city book 
transfers is known to have existed throughout the Middle Ages.  
Thus, between late 13th and early 14th century the moneychangers of Venice, the 
campsores, became bankers.59 They accepted deposits, lent out of them, and provided payment 
services from and to current accounts kept with them.60 Bankers held accounts with each other 
which possibly allowed for intra-city interbank transfers61 which may have been settled only on 
irregular intervals.  
Each bank kept with it only a fractional reserve, namely, a limited amount of coined 
money, ready to satisfy an anticipated demand for cash withdrawal; it lent or invested most of 
the money received on deposit. Availability of payment by book transfers, recognized by early 
14th century legislation in Venice, allowed banks to reduce cash holdings even further and 
increase their investments and credit extensions.  
However, throughout the Continent, during the 15th century, private deposit banks 
declined. Repeated bank failures undermined the confidence of merchants and further triggered 
hostility by public authorities.62 Together with a chronic shortage of good coins, the increased 
risk in keeping money with a banker led to a devaluation of “bank money” compared to that of 
“coined money”.63 Ultimately, in a process that “did not gain momentum until the last quarter of 
the sixteenth century,” public banks gradually replaced private banks in commercial centres.64 
                                                          
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1974, Phoenix Edition 1976) at 213 [de Roover, “New 
Interpretations”]. 
  
58
 See Raymond De Roover, “What is Dry Exchange?” in Julius Kirshner, ed, Business, Banking, and Economic 
Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Selected Studies of Raymond de Roover (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1974, Phoenix Edition 1976) 183 at 184 [de Roover, “Dry Exchange”]. 
 
59
 Sir William S Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol 8 (London: Methuen & Co., Sweet and Maxwell, 2nd ed: 
1937, rep. 1966) at 178.   
 
60
 See in detail: Reinhold Mueller, “The Role of Bank Money in Venice, 1300-1500”, in Fondazione Giorgio Cini et 
al., eds, Studi veneziani (NS) vol 3 (Pisa: Giardini, 1979) at 47. 
 
61
  But contrary to Mueller, ibid at 74-76, Mark Manning, Eriend Nier & Jochen Schanz, eds, The Economics of 
Large-value Payments and Settlement: Theory and Policy Issues for Central Banks (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) at 24 find “no conclusive evidence” for interbank transfers in Medieval Venice. 
 
62
 de Roover, “New Interpretations” supra note 57 at 219. 
63
  Frederic C Lane, Venice A Maritime Republic (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973) at 328-29 [Lane, 
Venice]; for the same phenomenon in Venice at a later period see ibid at 402. See also Frederic C Lane, “Venetian 
Bankers, 1496-1533: A Study in the Early Stages of Deposit Banking” (1937) 45 Journal of Political Economy 187 
at 200-01 [Lane, “Venetian”]. 
 
64
 de Roover, “New Interpretations”, supra note 57 at 223. For a discussion of the public bank in Venice as a 
successor of the private bank system that failed primarily due to excessive lending by means of simple book entries, 
see Charles F Dunbar, “The Bank of Venice” (1892) 6 Quarterly Journal of Economics 308; and Gino Luzzatto, 
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Heralding this development, Venice gave rise to a “distinctive style” of banking, referred to as 
giro banking, under which the primary purpose of banks was the making of payments on behalf 
of customers rather than making loans.65 For its part, The Bank of Amsterdam, “established in 
1609 under the guarantee of the city,”66 was a leader among the post-Medieval public banks.67 
During the late Middle Ages, and to accommodate intercity commerce, exchange banking 
evolved in Continental Europe side by side with deposit banking.68 It was practiced by large 
merchants who lent to exporters located in one market, who in turn sent goods for sale in another 
market. Repayment was made out of the proceeds of the sale, in the destination market, by the 
seller’s correspondent to the lender’s correspondent in that market.69 This practice gave rise to 
the bill of payment, being the predecessor of the bill of exchange.70 For their part, exchange 
                                                          
“Les banques publiques de Venise (Siècles XVI-XVIII)” in Johannes Gerard van Dillen, ed, History of the Principal 
Public Banks (London: Frank Cass, 1964, being 2nd impression of the 1934 1st edition, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1934) at 39. 
  
65
 Lane, Venice supra note 63 at 147. See also Lane, “Venetian” supra note 63 at 187 specifically rejecting earlier 
such institutions and stating that “Giro banks did not come into existence until the late sixteenth century, at Venice 
in 1584…” 
 
66
 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976; being the 1776 original text, 
edited by E. Cannan and prefaced by GJ Stigler, ‘Two Volumes in One’) vol 1 at 504. 
 
67
 See e.g. Johannes Gerard van Dillen, “The Bank of Amsterdam”, in van Dillen, ed, supra note 64 at 79; Adam 
Smith, ibid at 503-13; Pit Dehing & Marjolein C. ’t Hart, “Linking the Fortunes: Currency and Banking, 1550-1800” 
in Marjolein ’T Hart, Joost Jonker & Jan Luiten van Zanden, eds, A Financial History of the Netherlands 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 45-51; and Stephen Quinn & William Roberds, “The Big 
Problem of Large Bills: The Bank of Amsterdam and the Origins of Central Banking” (2007) [For a former version, 
see Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Papers Series, Working Paper 2005-16, August 2005 (albeit the latter 
contains lots of econometrics which is inaccessible to a non-specialist such as myself)].  For money and banking in 
Amsterdam see also Jan De Vries & An van der Woulde, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and 
Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 81-91 and 129-
34. 
 
68
 Raymond de Roover, “Banking and Credit in the Formation of Capitalism”, Fifth International Conference of 
Economic History Leningrad 1970 (Paris, 1979) at 9 [de Rover, “Banking and Credit”]. See in detail, Raymond de 
Roover, Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges: Italian Merchant Bankers, Lombards and Money 
Changers: A Study in the Origins of Banking (Cambridge, Mass: The Medieval Academy of America, 1948; 
republished, London: Routledge/Thoemmes Pres, 1999 as vol. II of The Emergence of International Business, 1200-
1800).  
 
69
 For a detailed analysis in a broad context, see de Roover, “The Organization of Trade” supra note 56 at 42.  
 
70
  de Roover identifies three stages in the history of the bill of exchange from its inception to the end of the 18th 
century: Raymond de Roover, L’Evolution de la Lettre de Change XIVe – XVIIIe siècles (Paris: Librairie Armand 
Colin, 1953) at 18-19 [de Roover, lettre de change]. He enumerates two subsequent periods, one of expansion, at the 
19th century during which the bill of exchange became discountable, followed by a subsequent contraction in terms 
of actual use. For the early bill of payment as a notarial instrument, see e.g. André-E Sayous, “L’origine de la lettre 
de change” (1933) 12 (Ser. 4) Revue historique de droit français et étranger 66; André-E Sayous, “Note sur l’origine 
de la lettre de change et les débuts de son emploi á Barcelone (XIVe siècle)’’(1934) 13 (Ser. 4) Revue historique de 
droit français et étranger 315; and André-E Sayous, “Les méthodes commerciales de Barcelone au XVe siècle, 
d’après des documents inédits de ses archives” (1936)15 (Ser.4) Revue historique de droit français et étranger 255 at 
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bankers formed an intercity network that gave rise to the emergence of an elaborate multilateral 
clearing and settlement arrangement, implemented by them periodically in medieval fairs.71   
(iii) Post-Medieval Era 
Against this background the modern banking system, accommodating the present 
payment system, was born in post-medieval England. Its roots are in the institutional 
transformation of the goldsmiths’ system and the establishment of the Bank of England that 
followed.72   
The process involved (i) the transformation of the business of individual goldsmiths into 
that of deposit bankers who accepted deposits, lent out of them, including by discounting bills of 
exchange, as well as facilitated for depositors’ cheque payments out of the deposits; (ii) the 
existence of a tight network of all such goldsmiths ready to extend credit to each other, so as to 
allow for reciprocal correspondent banking services facilitating interbank debt clearing and 
settlement originally on a bilateral and later on a multilateral basis, leading to the establishment 
of a clearing house, thereby allowing risk reduction, enhanced efficiency, and generating 
common services that facilitated further development;73  (iii) the establishment of the Bank of 
England, originally as a lender to the government and then, having adopted goldsmiths’ 
practices, gradually evolving in the subsequent two centuries into a modern central bank 
maintaining settlement accounts for deposit banks (being the successors of goldsmiths) so as to 
facilitate interbank final settlement as well as to become a lender of last resort;74  and (iv) the 
issuance of banknotes, first as circulating obligations of goldsmiths evidencing either deposits or 
                                                          
274-86 [Sayous, “méthodes commerciales XV”] at 274-86. With the disappearance of the notarial requirement, the 
instrument nevertheless retained some formal language: Marie-Thérèse Boyer-Xambeu, Ghislain Deleplace & 
Lucien Gillard, Private Money & Public Currencies: The 16th Century Challenge, translated by Azizeh Azodi (New 
York and London: ME Sharpe, 1994) at 30. 
 
71
 See Boyer-Xambeu et al., supra note 70 at 91-94 as well as at 70-91. See also de Roover, lettre de change, supra 
note 70 at 74-82; Usher, supra note 6 at 110-33; and Paul-Louis Huvelin, Essai historique sur le droit des Marchés 
& des Foires (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1897) at 534-93. 
 
72
 See e.g. Richard D Richards, The Early History of Banking in England (New York: A.M. Kelley, 1965, reprint of 
1929 edition). For a succinct summary, see Holdsworth, supra note 59 at 185-92. 
73
 See in detail, Stephen Quinn, “Balances and goldsmith-bankers: the co-ordination and control of inter-banker debt 
clearing in seventeenth-century London”, in David Mitchell, ed, Goldsmiths, Silversmiths and Bankers: Innovation 
and the Transfer of Skill, 1550 to 1750 (London: Alan Sutton Publishing and Centre for Metropolitan History, 1995) 
at 53. 
 
74
 See HV Bowen, “The Bank of England During the Long Eighteenth Century, 1694-1820” in  
Richard Roberts & David Kynaston, eds, The Bank of England: Money, Power, and Influence 1694-1994 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995). See also Richard D Richards, “The First Fifty Years of the Bank of England (1694-1744)”, 
in Johannes Gerard van Dillen, ed, History of the Principal Public Banks (London: Frank Cass, 1964, being 2nd 
impression of the 1934 1st ed., The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1934) at 201; Richard Roberts, “The Bank of England 
and the City” in Richard Roberts & David Kynaston, eds, The Bank of England: Money, Power, and Influence 1694-
1994 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at 152, 153. For its origins see also James E Thorold Rogers, The First Nine 
Years of the Bank of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1887).  
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loans, then as paper money issued by the goldsmiths, and ultimately, as paper money, ‘legal 
tender’, exclusively issued by the Bank of England.75   
Both correspondent banking and customer payment activity required intensive 
monitoring by the goldsmith-bankers. In turn, this facilitated credit decision-making and led to 
specialization in advancing information-intensive non-traded loans. Such lending became a 
principal niche for a profitable commercial banking business as well as effective financial 
intermediation for the economy as a whole. In providing such loans, as well as in issuing 
banknotes and discounting bills of exchange, the goldsmith-bankers came to provide a reliable 
source of liquidity to the economy. 
For its part, in departing from the model of the earlier Continental public bank, the Bank 
of England complemented private commercial banks without competing with or endeavouring to 
substitute for them. Rather, being their bank maintaining for them accounts, 76 it became able to 
furnish them with a source of liquidity so as to be a lender of last resort. As well, it provided 
them with the efficiency of multilateral settlement in reserve accounts held with it. In both ways, 
it gradually became as a ‘central bank’ an integral part of the private bank network.77  
The banknote was issued first by the goldsmith-banker,78 originally possibly as a 
‘warehouse receipt’ for deposited coins, and certainly against a fractional reserve of coins or 
metal.79 The power to issue banknotes was taken over by the Bank of England,80 with 
convertibility ultimately ceasing to exist altogether in the course of the 20th century.81 Using 
                                                          
75
 Notes of the Bank of England were made legal tender in England and Wales for all payments (except for by the 
Bank itself) over five pounds by s. 6 of the Bank of England Act, 1833, (U.K.), 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 98.   
76
 While certainly there was rivalry the fact is that “many goldsmiths opened accounts with the Bank within a few 
months of its creation”; James Milnes Holden, The History of Negotiable Instruments in English Law (Homes Beach 
Fla: WM W. Gaunt & Sons, Reprint 1993 of 1955 edition by Athlone Press) at 93.  
 
77
 See e.g. Ben Norman, Rachel Shaw & George Speight, “The history of interbank settlement arrangements: 
exploring central banks’ role in the payment system” (2011) Bank of England, Working Paper No 412, online: 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/pdf/research/Working_Paper_412.pdf>, accessed 27 December 2017. 
 
78
  See e.g. Richard D Richards, The Early History of Banking in England (New York: A.M. Kelley, 1965, reprint of 
1929 edition) at 40-43 [Richards, Early History]; Holden, supra note 76; Albert Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling: A 
History of English Money, 2nd ed by EV Morgan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) at 107-08; JK Horsefield, “The 
‘Stop of the Exchequer’ Re-visited” (1982), 35 Economic History Review 511 at 523 [Horsefield, “Exchequer”]; 
Tassell and Lee v. Lewis (1695), 1 Ld. Raym. 743 at 744, 91 E.R. 1397 at 1398 (K.B.).  
79
 Notes were issued by banks either against deposit of specie, that is, precious metal or coins, or against the 
negotiation, and hence in discount, of bills of exchange, as well as of promissory notes; Smith, supra note 66; 
George Tucker, The Theory of Money & Banks Investigated (New York: AM Kelly, 1964, reprint of 1839 original) 
at 161, 164. 
80
 See e.g. Holden, supra note 76 at 92 
 
81
 Convertibility was abolished for good in the UK under the Gold Standard (Amendment) Act, 1931, 21 & 22 Geo. 
V, c. 46. 
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funds on deposit at the central bank, private banks buy banknotes from the central bank and sell 
them for use to the public, against funds held by its members on deposit with private banks. As 
they are exchanged out of and back into deposits “according to customer payment habits,” as a 
form of cash, banknotes (together with coins), are not the principal form of money, a role now 
preserved to scriptural money.82   
The integration of banks into a banking network, consisting of commercial banks 
multilaterally clearing in a clearinghouse83 and settling on the books of the central bank which is 
an integral part of this network, has led to a fundamental albeit subtle change in the mode of the 
creation of money through ‘banking’. Thus, deposits made to commercial banks are typically not 
anymore in the form of specie or commodity money. Rather, they are primarily created by 
lending into customers’ deposit accounts. For its part, an addition to bank’s liquid assets is 
typically made not in the form of specie or commodity money, but rather in the form of an 
increase in the sum credited to that bank’s own account; at least for a large bank such increase is 
in the credit to its account with the central bank.84 Other than by receiving an interbank payment, 
liquidity designed to meet deposit obligations is obtained at least by a large commercial bank, in 
the form of credit posted to its account with the central bank, through borrowing in an interbank 
market, selling government securities, or as a last resort, borrowing from the central bank. At the   
same time, non-cash payment activity continues to be primarily carried out over deposit accounts 
held in commercial banks. Monitoring depositors’ payment activity in accounts continues to 
facilitate credit decision-making and lead to specialization in advancing information-intensive 
non-traded loans, so as to continue to be a principal niche for a profitable commercial banking 
business as well as effective financial intermediation for the economy as a whole.85 This must be 
true also in an era where credit information may be available from other sources such as credit 
bureaux.  
The architecture, instruments and institutions of the English system spread globally. At 
present, commercial banks take deposits from the public, lend into customers’ deposit accounts, 
and provide payment services in conjunction with deposit accounts. In each country, at least all 
major commercial banks clear multilaterally and settle over deposit accounts they hold with the 
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central bank.86 They also maintain correspondent relationships87 with local small banks as well 
as with cross-border or overseas large banks, so as to create a global network over which in 
principle non-cash payments can be made by any account holder to another in any currency. 
Moreover, as a rule, paper money in the form of banknotes is issued in each country by its 
central bank.   
Banknotes, together with coins for small change, constitute cash (or currency). Payment 
in cash is typically made face to face, without any intermediation. Noncash payments, whether 
face to face or between distant parties, require intermediation. Where payer and payee hold their 
respective accounts with the same bank a noncash payment is carried out by that bank debiting 
the payer’s account and crediting that of the payee. Where payer and payee hold their respective 
accounts at two banks which are correspondents a noncash payment involves debiting the 
payer’s account by the payer’s bank, crediting the payee’s account by the payee’s bank, and 
either debiting the account of the payer’s bank by the payee’s bank or crediting the account of 
the payee’s bank by the payer’s bank. In a domestic payment system, at least all major banks 
hold their accounts with the central bank so that the interbank component of payment between 
two such banks is carried out as part of the multilateral interbank settlement on the books of the 
central bank. Otherwise, a noncash payment requires a chain of settlements on correspondent 
accounts, with or without settlement on the books of the central bank, or alternatively, one 
settlement between correspondent banks followed by another settlement on the books of a central 
bank. To take a simple example for the latter, the interbank component of a noncash payment in 
Australian currency from a customer of Bank A in Canada to a customer of Bank B in Australia, 
assuming that the two are non-correspondent major banks, is carried out by Bank A using its 
correspondent, another Australian major bank, which in turn, settles with Bank B on the books of 
the central bank of Australia.  
Three principal features characterize payment services facilitated by the modern banking 
system. First, value held on deposit with participating banks, often referred to as ‘bank money’ 
or more specifically, ‘commercial-bank money’, is denominated in and is redeemable to fiat 
money (or banknotes), that is, an official currency or ‘legal tender’. Second, such value is in the 
form of a claim in an account maintained with a bank. Typically, this is an asset account; 
however, payment may be made by means of a credit card, in which case payment is carried 
from the payer’s credit account rather than asset account having a positive balance in bank 
money. Also in such a case, payment results in an increase in the sum of bank money available to 
the payee in the payee’s asset account—while the payer becomes obligated to reimburse the 
payer’s bank, typically (if not exclusively) in bank money (originating from the payer’s asset 
account). Third, claims against the central bank, often referred to as claims to ‘central-bank 
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money’, are available both to holders of fiat money/banknotes and the banks.88 The latter 
multilaterally settle their reciprocal claims on the books of the central bank. Obligations on bank 
deposits payable on demand are referred to as ‘scriptural money’, being a category covering both 
commercial and central bank money.89  
 
The non-cash payment system is then premised on the use of ‘scriptural money.’ Its 
architecture is centralized. Thereunder, a bank maintains deposit accounts for customers (who 
thus keep with it commercial bank money). For its part, a large bank may also maintain deposit 
accounts (in commercial bank money) for correspondent banks. Finally, the central bank 
maintains settlement (deposit) accounts at least for large banks (which thus hold with it central 
bank money).90 As a whole, the system can be visualized as a pyramid at whose head or apex 
stands the central bank with which at least large banks hold accounts, and possibly with small 
banks holding accounts with large banks. Individual and corporate customers are at the bottom or 
base of the pyramid holding their accounts in banks (whether large or small).91 
 
III. The coming of the cyber age: Electronic payments, e-money, access to central bank 
balances, the blockchain, and digital currencies  
(i) The advent of electronic banking and e-money 
 
            Historically, payment instructions accessing bank money were either oral or, more 
typically, in writing. Use of telecommunication, first the telegraph and then the transatlantic 
cable, goes back to mid-19th century.92 However, the watershed of electronic banking, where 
payments are processed as well as transmitted electronically, is a development of the second part 
of the 20th century. Once it became possible to transmit instructions electronically, from a 
computer or computer terminal, the electronic funds transfer was born. Telecommunication in 
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the electronic age was originally on cable or wire;93 subsequently the wireless option became 
available,94 and ultimately, instructions could be transmitted over the Internet.95  
 
Developments have not been limited to communication. It became also possible to ‘load’ 
monetary value (that is, value denominated in an official or, in fact, any unit of account) on a 
stored-value device such as a card or personal computer. In such a case, the value became known 
as ‘electronic money’ or ‘e-money’. The majority of e-money schemes have involved “balance-
based” products. In such products, devices store and manipulate a numeric ledger, with 
transactions performed as debits or credits to a balance. Accordingly, this type of e-money is a 
monetary balance or value recorded electronically on and is available from a stored-value 
product (SVP), such as a chips card, or a hard drive in a personal computer, or a server.96 Such a 
record, accessible from the device without resort to the bank’s computer system, can be viewed 
as a decentralized bank account.97 Under a variant of the aforementioned product, monetary 
value is not loaded on the device; rather, it is available from a master account, belonging to the 
issuer or someone acting on the issuer’s behalf. However, as in the case of e-money, monetary 
value is not available from the payer-debtor’s own bank account.98 
 
Prepaid value is in a bank account, even if not that of the payer. But also, e-money is 
ultimately a variant of ‘bank money’;99 thus, whether e-money is purchased in cash or by means 
of a debit to the purchaser’s bank account, the issuer has its own bank account credited with the 
amount sold to the purchaser. Where the e-money is purchased from a bank the account credited 
is the reserve account of the selling bank. Payment in e-money is forwarded to the payee’s bank 
which credits the payee’s account with the amount of payment and forwards the e-money itself 
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for redemption against the value previously credited to the seller’s account. In the final analysis, 
even where pre-paid value or e-money is not issued by a bank, a scheme must facilitate the 
purchase and redemption through banks.    
 
 For its part ‘electronic banking’ enhanced payment services in several other ways. First, 
it introduced electronic processing also to paper-based instruments such as cheques.100 Second, it 
facilitated new as well as variations of existing products.101 Third, new players, such as money 
transmitters102 or payment institutions,103 and e-money institutions104 entered the scene as end-
payment institutions in a payment transaction, facilitating domestic and international payments in 
small amounts to parties who do not have bank accounts. Fourth, the power balance in the 
partnership between financial institutions and telecommunication carriers has shifted, allowing 
the latter a greater voice and share in the payment market.105 Fifth, in facilitating instant 
communication, electronic banking allowed the use of risk reduction methods as well as instant 
authorization leading to an immediate final credit to the payee’s account way ahead of the 
interbank settlement; such may be the case in domestic large value wholesale payment 
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systems106, and retail fast payments networks.107 This is also the case in a typical credit card 
payment, even when it is carried internationally.108   
 
  Indeed, electronic banking facilitated branchless banking to the detriment of banks with a 
large branch network.109 As well, possible impact of electronic banking on monetary policy has 
been fiercely debated.110 At the same time, none of the various facets of electronic banking has 
affected the architecture of the payment system even as it expanded its scope and globalized it. 
No wonder, the law governing wireless instructions is the same as the one governing wire 
orders.111 For their part, money transmitters, payment institutions as well as e-money institutions 
have been using banks as intermediaries in the transfers in which they participate at either end of 
the transaction.112 They thus increased rather than decreased payment intermediation.  
Furthermore, not treating such institutions as deposit takers hinges on a ‘benevolent’ strict view 
of ‘deposit taking’ so as to exclude the delivery of money for a specific purpose.113 True, a 
payment instruction issued from a digital device such as a mobile phone rather than from a 
computer terminal or computer is often said to result in a mobile payment. When the payment 
scheme is operated over mobile devices it is even described as involving ‘mobile money’. 
However, in substance, payment orders initiated from a digital or mobile device is a specie of an 
electronic funds transfer.114  For its part ‘mobile money’ is a form of ‘e-money’.  It is therefore 
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confusing to treat such developments as reflecting a “digitization of state-issue currenc[y]” even 
in connection with an on-line (e-commerce) transaction.115 Ultimately efficiency is bound either 
to turn payment institutions into banks or for banks take over payment institutions, either directly 
or as subsidiaries, so as to eliminate this unnecessary layer of intermediation. The issue for banks 
is the adoption of a different level of service rather than the elimination of banks as an essential 
component in linking between payers and payees.  
 
The broader question however is whether ‘electronic banking’ has not been superseded 
by ‘Fintech,’ ’snatching’ money and payments from the banking system. Fintech refers to the use 
of technology by IT firms116 to deliver financial solutions directly to purchasers of financial 
products such as payment services.117 Technology designed to deliver financial solutions is 
however available also to banks whether directly or indirectly by purchase from IT firms. The 
thesis of this paper is that the function of banks as deposit takers as well as the existence of a 
bank network provide banks an edge in competing with IT firms in delivering payment services 
to the public. By comparison to those provided by banks, payment means and methods that 
purport to bypass the banking system are inherently inadequate. 
 For sure, there is nothing to preclude IT firms from becoming banks and competing with 
existing banks on equal footing. Indeed, in Antiquity and the Middle Ages it was the money 
changer who became a deposit banker. In the Middle Ages it was the large merchant who made 
and received intercity commercial payments. Subsequently, it was the goldsmith who became a 
banker in post-Medieval England. According to this logic, there is nothing new in the 
transformation of the IT firm into a bank; the IT firm merely goes in the footsteps of other 
professionals who became bankers. This is true and yet it does not convey the full picture. With 
their transformation into bankers, the moneychangers, intercity merchants and goldsmiths 
created a new space, heretofore neither known nor occupied. In contrast, ‘banking’ is now a 
well-defined industry: technology is not something new for banks; they have been developing as 
well as purchasing it for awhile. Hence the idea that banks will unfold and become extinct like 
dinosaurs is unfounded. IT firms turning banks join an existing and well-functioning network 
rather than supersede its existing members. To fully defeat incumbents, IT firms must develop a 
model different than that of ‘banking’; the ensuing discussion is designed to disprove the 
adequacy if not the existence of such a model.    
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(ii) Availability of central bank account balances and their equivalents to the public  
 
  In reviewing the present architecture of the payment system prior to the Fintech era 
Goodfriend opined that “… although valuing deposits at par and holding fractional reserves is 
efficient for individual banks, it had the potential for generating destabilizing systemwide bank 
runs.” In his view this risk is however “remedied efficiently by central bank monetary policy,”118 
as well as by other payment system policies.119 Conversely, reviving and building on old 
ideas,120 a recent set of proposals will make central bank money deposits available to the public 
either directly or indirectly. A typical rationale, premised on new technological developments, is 
that: 
 
Central banking evolved at a time when service provision in local branches was 
integral to providing banking services. In that world it made sense for the central 
bank to ‘wholesale’ its core exchange settlement and liquidity support services to 
banks which would then ‘retail’ them to individuals and businesses via their 
branches, passbooks and cheque accounts. It was impracticable for central banks’ 
services to be provided to individuals.  
 
At the same time, the rationale goes on, “[m]odern technology enables us to extend some core 
central banking services to individuals and businesses.”121 
 
 One proposal premised on this rationale is the provision of payment services to the public 
exclusively by a designate government agency that will take deposits from the public but will 
have restricted investment powers so as to be able to invest only in safe assets such as super-
collateralized real estate mortgages. Under that proposal, payment transactions will be carried 
out over deposit accounts with respect to which the liability of the depositary (the government 
agency) is effectively secured by investment in high quality assets. On this basis, such deposits 
will benefit from unlimited guarantee of the central bank. Under that proposal, commercial banks 
will be able to lend to customers and sell them investment products but be precluded from 
providing payment services.122   
 
 However, one may reasonably suppose that in upsetting the delicate balance between the 
roles of the public and private sectors in the monetary and payment systems, this proposal will be 
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perceived as going too far (or in fact, nowhere). Certainly, in monopolizing payment services in 
the hands of a government agency, the proposal will stifle competition and give no incentive to 
innovate. Furthermore, the proposal is not persuasive in mandating central bank guarantee on the 
top of the requirement to invest deposited funds in safe assets. I therefore doubt that in a 
capitalist economy that proposal will persuade policy makers. At the same time, unclothing it 
from these objectionable elements, the proposal is a reminiscent of an earlier idea, that of 
‘narrow banking’; thereunder payment transactions are carried out over bank deposits of which 
the proceeds are invested in safe assets.123 ‘Narrow banking’ does not require the 
superimposition of central bank guarantee and in fact does not alter the traditional roles of 
commercial banks as deposit takers, providers of payment services, and lenders.  
 
 Under another proposal the central bank will open accounts and offer payment services 
directly to the public. This proposal is however said to impose “a large administrative burden” on 
the central bank that “could distract it from its other functions in [regulating] and managing 
monetary policy.” It is further acknowledged that under the proposal the central bank, “a state-
owned enterprise,” would undertake pure market functions, in which it “would have no 
commercial incentive to innovate [payment] services.”124 To meet these objections, under a 
variant, it is proposed that public access to scriptural central bank money or its equivalent will be 
indirect.125  
 
 There are however two alternative approaches to such a variant. One is premised on ‘full 
reserve banking’126 while the other is of ‘plain sovereign money’.127 Briefly stated, under the 
former, the entire quantity of commercial bank money, namely, the total amount of demand 
deposits with banks, is to be backed by 100% reserve of central bank money held by commercial   
banks on deposit with the central bank.128 
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Under the latter, that of ‘plain sovereign money,’129 the distinction between the two types 
of scriptural money is abolished; what exists is only one category of scriptural money, central 
bank money.130 It will be available to members of the public in accounts on the books of the 
central bank; unless operated by the central bank itself, as discussed above, such accounts will be 
operated through and managed by commercial banks,131 possibly in ‘transaction accounts’132 
which will be distinguished from ‘investment accounts’ of which funds may be invested in 
designated collections of assets of a broadly similar risk profile. Each investment fund will be a 
distinct legal and corporate entity. Lending will be carried out of investment funds (possibly as 
well as from long-term borrowing from the public) and should not create additional money or 
purchasing power.133 Investment account holders will bear the risk of non-payment on due date, 
and not being available to them prior to that, sovereign money owed to them will not serve as 
commercial bank money. Rather, prior to maturity on the investment account, sovereign money 
deposited in them will be lent by the bank and thus will exclusively be used by borrowers from 
the bank.134 Banking will thus fully reclaim its function as an intermediation between savers and 
borrowers.  
 
Under both approaches commercial banks will cease to create money by lending into 
customers’ deposits. Money creation will be under the exclusive power of the central bank135 
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 Beware of inconsistent use of terminology. Andrew Jackson, Sovereign Money -  paving the way for a 
sustainable recovery (London: Positive Money, November 2013), online: <https://positivemoney.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/Sovereign-Money-Final-Web.pdf>, accessed 28 December 2017, uses the term to denote 
central bank money distributed directly to business to fund infrastructure projects. 
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 However, it does not make sense to me to have a hybrid system under which scriptural money is available to the 
public in both commercial and central bank money as I read Dyson & Hodgson supra note 124 at 28-30 to suggest.  
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 For a precedent from Sri Lanka, albeit for investors’ securities accounts operated by intermediaries on the books 
of the central bank, see Payment & Settlement Systems Act, No. 28 of 2005, Chapter II Securities Accounts (Secs 6-
10), online: <http://www.cbsl.gov.lk/pics_n_docs/09_lr/_docs/acts/Paymt_&_setmt_sys_act.pdf>, accessed 28 
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 For these two options see Michael D Bordo and Andrew T Levin, “Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future 
of Monetary Policy” (2017) NBER, Working Paper 23711, online: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w23711>, accessed 
28 December 2017. 
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 Where required to meet demand further, lending may be done by the creation of new money by the central bank 
to be lent to banks and other lending institutions for the purposes of relending it to borrowers in the real economy. 
See Dyson, Hodgson & van Lerven, supra note 127 at 36.  
 
134
 Legally of course on maturity of the investment account the bank will be liable to depositors and investors 
regardless of possible default by borrowers, in which case it will be up to the bank to find sovereign money from 
other sources to fund its liability to depositors and investors. 
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 In connection with sovereign money see e.g. Dyson, Hodgson and van Lerven, supra note 127 at 28-37. One 
proposal for full reserve banking is for the central bank to act as a ‘currency board’ in issuing new money only 
against a basket of available assets (of which gold is only one); see Warren Coats, “My Political Platform for the 
Nation – 2017” (31 December 2016), Warren’s space (blog), online:  
<https://wcoats.wordpress.com/2016/12/31/my-political-platform-for-the-nation-2017/>, accessed 28 December 
2017 (see section on Monetary and Financial Policies); Warren Coats, “Real SDR Currency Board” (2011) 22:2 
Central Banking Journal, online: <https://works.bepress.com/warren_coats/25/>, accessed 28 December 2017. 
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with commercial banks either being limited to issue its ‘replication’ or ‘shadow’ to the public, 
but not expand its quantity (under the full reserve banking alternative), or being restrained from 
issuing it at all (under the plain sovereign money alternative).136 They will however be able to 
lend and provide payment services.  
 
 An analysis of the pros and cons of each alternative, vis-à-vis each other as well as by 
reference to the current fractional reserve regime, is beyond the scope of this paper as well as of 
the competence of this author. At the same time, in relation to the topic at hand, under both 
alternative banks will continue to accept deposits, make loans (albeit not out of demand 
deposits), and provide payment services. For sure, they may face competition from ‘payment 
institutions’ that do not provide ‘investment accounts’ services as well as lenders providing 
‘investment accounts’ but not ‘payment accounts.’ However, it is reasonable to expect that such 
competitors will be regulated, respectively on the payment, and saving and lending sides, so it 
will be for banks to leverage the combined services they give to their advantage. For example, as 
now, monitoring the payment activity of a customer will help a bank in making its lending 
decision regarding that customer. Hence, a reform under any of these lines will not change the 
role of commercial banks in the payment system.  
 
What may however change is the legal underpinning of the bank’s liability for money 
deposited in the payments or transactions account. At the moment, a bank is liable to a depositor 
on a simple debt since money deposited belongs to the bank which can use it as it wishes.137 
Conversely, under a ‘full reserve banking’ scheme, the bank’s obligation may be conceptualized 
by analogy to that of a securities intermediary that under Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code in the United States138 as well as under the Uniform Securities Transactions Act in 
Canada.139 According to this legislation, under the ‘indirect holding’ regime, a securities 
intermediary is liable to an investor on a ‘securities entitlement’ against which the securities 
intermediary must maintain 100% ‘financial asset’.140 At the same time, under a ‘plain sovereign 
money’ regime the customers will be entitled from their banks under an ‘irregular deposit’ which 
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 For the view that “both logically and according to the International Accounting Standards, sovereign money 
cannot be considered to be a debt of the state. Instead, sovereign money conforms to the classification of equity,” 
see Ben Dyson & Graham Hodgson, Accounting for Sovereign Money: Why State-Issued Money is Not ‘Debt’ 
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 See Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 8 (1994) Sections 8-501 to 8-511, in conjunction with definitions 
in Section 8-102, online: <https://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/8>, accessed 28 December 2017. 
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secbities-transfer-act>, accessed 28 December 2017. 
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 See in general e.g. Benjamin Geva, “Securities Transfers in the Indirect Holding System – Law Reform in 
Canada in the Footsteps of UCC Article 8” (2007) 18 Journal of Banking and Financial Law and Practice (Australia) 
72-77. 
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envisages a claim premised on an unidentified portion of a mixture of fungible assets (e.g. 
money) to which ownership passed to the depositary from the various depositors.141  
 
Finally, the reader is reminded that historically proposals such as those outlined above 
preceded the digital age.142 Their revival at this point of time can be attributed to the greater ease 
of implementing them by means of technological innovations that did not exist at the time such 
proposals were first raised. However, technological feasibility does not necessarily lead to 
economic justification. For example, as pointed out at the beginning of this section, albeit ahead 
of Fintech, Goodfriend was on record highlighting the public’s substantial efficiency gains of the 
fractional reserve at the cost of accepted risks, which are anyway mitigated by monetary policy, 
central bank lending and deposit insurance.143 To say the least, under the present system, banks 
are able to share with customers profit realized from lending out of demand deposits; the chance 
is that, in a regime under which scriptural central bank money is available to the public in any 
form, payment services will be more costly. Whether and to what extent gains in safety outweigh 
efficiency losses may be in the eyes of the beholder. This Section should be taken as outlining 
banks’ continued role and relative advantage in a central bank scriptural money environment 
rather than necessarily to unequivocally support such a regime.  
  
(iii) Cryptocurrencies and blockchains 
 
All such innovations, namely the ability to access accounts and transact digitally, the 
advent of e-money, and the possibility of making central bank money or its equivalent available 
to the public have not changed the nature of an interbank transfer as a transfer of scriptural 
money in the form of a balance of monetary value.    
 
A payment instruction and monetary value expressed in encrypted strings of digits are 
respectively an electronic payment order and electronic money; nonetheless, strictly speaking, 
they are to be distinguished from digital currencies in which the encrypted string of digits 
identify a specific monetary item.  Indeed, a minority of e-money products may still operate on 
devices that store electronic "notes" (sometimes called coins or tokens) that are uniquely 
identified by a serial number and are associated with a fixed, unchangeable denomination. In 
such a "note-based" model, transactions are performed by transferring notes from one device to 
another, and the balance of funds stored on a device is thus the sum of the denominations of all 
notes on the device. However, as in the “balance-based” products, transferability is typically 
restricted, and consumer cardholders may usually make payments only to merchants who may 
clear these payments or deposit the accumulated balances exclusively through their acquiring 
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 In general, for the irregular deposit, see Robert W Lee, The Elements of Roman Law with a Translation of 
the Institutes of Justinian, 4th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1956) at 295 and R. Zimmermann, The Law of 
Obligations-Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Cape Town: Juta, 1990) at 215-19. 
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 Particularly for full-reserve banking. See Lainà, supra note 123. 
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 Goodfriend, supra note 10 at 261. Bank regulation could be added to the listed items.  
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banks.144 Arguably however, such a product provides the link between traditional value-transfer 
systems to innovative circulating digital coins.   
  The ensuing discussion excludes currencies not linked to the real economy145 and is 
limited to coins that could be liquefied and redeemed, so as to be available for use in real trading, 
as well as for purchase of goods and services. Payment by such digital coins has the potential of 
bypassing both the bank account and the centralized multilateral interbank settlement. For its 
part, a digital coin is “an entity that amounts to a string of bits.” The string must have a 
numerical value and it must have a unique identity, something against which “[c]oins with a 
definite physical existence are inherently immunized.” After all, unlike physical currency which 
cannot be repaid by the payer once it has been handed over to the payee, “a [spent] digital coin 
keeps a copy of itself in the hands of the payer,” who may thus either mistakenly or fraudulently 
re-spend it.146 Hence, double spending is an issue for all types of digital currency. 
The ‘series of bits’ which constitutes a digital coin can be either ‘self-anchored’ or in a 
‘claim-check’ (redeemable token) format.147 In this respect the distinction is not necessarily 
between privately issued digital currencies, known as virtual currencies,148 and digital currencies 
issued by central banks (or otherwise by the state), generally known as Central Bank Digital 
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 CPSS, Security of Electronic Money (Basel: BIS, 1996) particularly at 5, online: 
<https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d18.pdf>, accessed 28 December 2017. 
 
145
 Such are:  
i) closed/‘in-game only’ schemes, in which a link to the real economy or fiat currency hardly exists; ii) 
schemes with unidirectional flow, under which the currency may originally be purchased with a fiat 
currency but may not be converted back to it, such as Facebook Credits, and even; iii) schemes with a 
bidirectional flow, envisaging conversion in both directions, albeit usually not used in entirely open loops 
throughout the entire economy, such as air miles in Frequent Flyer Programs  
See European Central Bank/Eurosystem, Virtual Currency Schemes (October 2012) at 12–15, online: 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf>, accessed 12 March 2018. For an 
explanation as to why such a currency will not "migrate" to the real economy, see, e.g. Joshua S Gans and Hanna 
Halaburda, supra note 115.  
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 Gideon Samid, Tethered Money: Managing Digital Currency Transactions (London: Academic Press, 2015) at 
105-106. 
 
147
 Samid, ibid at 108. 
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 I use ‘virtual currencies’ in the sense of privately issued digital currencies, as for example under the Regulation of 
Virtual Currency Businesses Act, online: 
<http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Regulation%20of%20Virtual-Currency%20Businesses%20Act> 
accessed 28 December 2017, s.102(23) of which defining "[v]irtual currency" as "a digital representation of value 
that is used as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, or a store of value; and is not legal tender…" "Legal tender" 
is defined in s.102(8) as 
"the medium of exchange or unit of value, including the coin or paper money of the United States, issued 
by the United States or by another government." 
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Currencies (CBDCs). Nonetheless, a digital currency issued by a central bank may not be self-
anchored; rather, it must be a claim-check only in the sense that it entitles its holder to redeem or 
convert it either to bank money or physical currency in the same amount. Conversely, a virtual 
currency may be either self-anchored or a claim-check.  
Self-anchored digital currencies are mathematical creatures;149 they hinge on 
cryptographic algorithms, each being “a procedure or formula for solving a problem,”150 not only 
for protection against hacking but also to control the creation of new units and facilitate 
payments. Not being anchored to a specific tradeable asset, such as a commodity or a fiat 
currency, a self-anchored digital currency is inherently unstable, volatile, and easily amenable 
for speculation.151  
 Conversely, in a claim-check format, a digital coin is a claim against a specified measure 
of a defined tradeable asset, or a cocktail thereof, such as a commodity or a fiat currency.152   Its 
bit string may be defined by and expressed in sequences of bits which are totally and completely 
random and pattern-less.153 In principle, and of course subject to authorization by law, a digital 
coin may be issued also by (or on behalf of) the central bank as a claim to its own fiat currency, 
and not as a self-anchored digital currency. In a properly managed virtual currency issued in a 
claim-check format, every digital coin should always be backed 1-to-1 by the same value of the 
underlying asset held in reserves, so as to be available for redemption on demand even when 
made by all holders at the same time. Reserve reports are to be published daily and frequently 
audited.154  
 
Broadly speaking, ‘cryptography’ denotes “a method of storing and transmitting data in a 
particular form so that only those for whom it is intended can read and process it.”155 At the same 
time, strictly speaking, the term points at a specific method to that end, under which “complexity 
… is injected into data so that only those who possess a key … can remove the complexity … 
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accessed 28 December 2017. 
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and understand the intended message, while those without the key will not be able to retrieve the 
hidden message in a timely manner.” The “process of applying cryptography to a message so that 
only its intended readers can understand it” is called ‘encryption’; the reverse, namely the 
“process of using a … key to recover the intended message from its encrypted form,” is called 
‘decryption.’ Where the sender and receiver of a cryptographic message “share the same key 
data or mutually deducible key data,” encryption is ‘symmetric’. Otherwise, where they do not 
share the same key data, encryption is said to be ‘asymmetric’. Cryptographic complexity 
addresses factors relating to the decryption of the message and its result.156 Accordingly, as 
explained further below, “cryptocurrency” denotes a digital currency in which encryption 
techniques are used to regulate the generation of units of currency and verify the execution of 
payment transactions157 on a decentralized network.                
                                               
           A fundamental distinction thus exists between centralized and decentralized digital 
currency schemes. A scheme in which coins are issued and redeemed under a centralized 
protocol is said to be centralized. At the same time, a digital currency that is issued, transferred, 
and redeemed over a distributed ledger is decentralized. Finally, a digital currency transferable 
over a distributed ledger and yet issued by a centralized operator is hybrid.158 Regardless, payees 
may protect themselves against receiving digital coins that are either fake or have already been 
paid (or ‘double spent’) by respective payers by consulting an ‘oracle’ as to their validity. In case 
of a centralized system, the ‘oracle’ is the issuer; in a decentralized system, the ‘oracle’ is the 
blockchain.159 
 
            The distributed ledger underlying decentralization is an asset database that can be shared 
across a network of multiple sites, geographies or institutions.160 Blockchain is an underlying 
technology, requiring the Internet to support and maintain its peer-to-peer network, that enables 
digital implementation of a distributed ledger. Being a computerized ledger on a distributed 
network, it generates a single version of the record on each computer and in essence is:161 
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 For definition of “cryptographic complexity” (as well as “cryptographic equivocation”), see Samid, supra note 
146 at 139–40 (Glossary). 
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 This definition slightly modifies the one from https://medium.com/@Wolfofcrypto/basic-cryptocurrency-starter-
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ledger-technology.pdf>, accessed 28 December 2017.  
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 UK Government Office for Science, Ibid at 17. See also e.g. CPMI, Distributed ledger technology in payment, 
clearing and settlement system – An analytical framework (Basel: BIS, February 2017), online: 
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a type of a database that takes a number of records and puts them in a block … 
Each block is then ‘chained’ to the next block, using a cryptographic signature. 
This allows block chains to be used like a ledger, which can be shared and 
corroborated by anyone with the appropriate permissions. 
Accuracy of the ledger is corroborated under a method determined under rules adhered by 
participants. Record security and visibility to authorized users is ensured by cryptography. 
 
Cryptography is thus used in cryptocurrencies to express and protect the value of the 
coins (the sequence of the bits), to prevent counterfeiting and fraudulent transactions, as well as 
to perform the validation and execution of transactions records via a distributed ledger, such as 
the blockchain. As explained below, each block contains a cryptographic hash or algorithm that 
links it to the previous block along with a timestamp for the transactions from that block. The 
network allows online payments to be sent directly from one  party to another without going 
through a bank or any other centralized counterparty.162 
 
The pioneering digital cash scheme, and the most prominent one so far, is Bitcoin.163 It is 
a virtual, self-anchored cryptocurrency and a peer-to-peer decentralized system.164 In his seminal 
paper,165 its mythological founder Satoshi Nakamoto defined Bitcoin as an “electronic coin” 
consisting of a “chain of digital signatures” transferable from the payer to the payee “by digitally 
signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding them 
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33 
 
to the end of the coin.”. Premised on distributed ledger technology (DLT), Bitcoin was born out 
of an ambition to create government-independent, censorship-resistant money. 
            Bitcoin payments are carried out over the Bitcoin network through ‘asymmetric’, 
cryptography.166 Each participant is assigned a pair of keys: one private that is to be kept by the 
participant confidential, and one public to be made known to potential counterparties. To initiate 
payment, the payee sends the payer the payee’s public key. Using the payee’s public key 
together with data relating to the previous transaction to create a message, the payer’s software 
will ‘hash’, namely crunch down the message data into a few lines, and encrypt it with the 
payer’s own private key, thereby digitally signing it. A hash function irreversibly maps a variable 
length message to data of a fixed-size bit string length, called a ‘hash’, ‘hash value’ or 
‘digest.’167  
 
            To carry out payment, the payer submits the transaction to its local node, which checks, 
among other things, that the payer has the bitcoins the payer now wants to spend. The local node 
provides a go-ahead for the transaction processing and broadcasts it to other nodes through the 
entire distributed network. All payments are sent to the network and are public, except that no 
information is given as to the identity of the parties, other than the wallets involved. Payments 
are ‘time-stamped’ so as to ensure that data will be neither altered nor reused, thereby 
eliminating double spending.168 In a way, this is an accounting scheme, using crypto principles 
rather than plain identification of digital coins. 
 
            Each node is operated by a ‘miner’. Miners then bundle the proposed payment with 
others and create a new block for the blockchain. The new block is hashed and, together with 
other data, is rehashed. The data is repeatedly fed through a cryptographic ‘hash’ function. The 
hash is put into the header of the proposed block and becomes the basis for a mathematical 
puzzle. The ‘miners’ compete to reach a solution for it, and the first to come up with the right 
solution, as accepted by the majority of miners who submitted ‘proof of work’,169 is rewarded 
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with newly ‘minted’ bitcoins. The mathematical puzzle is hard to solve, but once found, it is easy 
for the network to confirm that the answer is correct. Nodes accept the block, whose header 
contains the hash of the previous block’s header, by adding it to the chain that stretches back to 
the first Bitcoin block (the genesis block), containing the first transaction in the Bitcoin network. 
This construction is designed to make the Bitcoin blockchain tamperproof: if one tries to fake a 
transaction by changing a block that had already been stored in the blockchain that block’s hash 
would be different and ought to be apparent to all as having been tampered with. The ‘coin’ thus 
carries with it its entire history so that each payment becomes part of its code. 
 
Payments are made from one Bitcoin wallet to another. Each such wallet is a computer 
file or a software program which has an email address. The wallet stores both the private key (in 
effect the passcode) and the bitcoin170 balance controlled by it. What is transferred is ‘monetary 
fluid’ representing the bitcoin sum accessed from the payer’s wallet and originating from all 
Bitcoin ‘coins’ accessed from that wallet.171 Stated otherwise, a payer is unable to designate and 
set aside for payment any particular bitcoin. In effect, payment can be made in any sum available 
from the wallet, and regardless, at the end of the process, new bitcoins become associated with 
the payee’s wallet, while those still associated with the payer’s wallet may have changed their 
value and hence their identity. Transaction output is thus said to differ from transaction input, if 
only due to the diversified chain of provenance of input (from the payer’s wallet). It would have 
been more accurate to speak of a Bitcoin payment resulting in a ‘coin’ being transformed rather 
than transferred, except that each resulting ‘coin’ carries with it identities of its predecessors as 
well as the impact of its subsequent partial use. Transaction information is stored on the 
blockchain; strictly speaking, the ‘coins’ themselves are not discrete things and are thus not 
stored anywhere. As a string of bits they however exist in the wallet so that to access them one 
needs both the password and control over the physical device or cloud having the wallet. If the 
device is lost, the use of the bitcoins remains available to the owner only where the wallet has 
been backed up (and the one in the device possession as well as with knowledge of the passcode 
has not spent them).172  
Developing laws to meet DLT in general and Bitcoin in particular is quite challenging.173 
Legal rules applicable to a DLT can be divided into those dealing with governance and those dealing 
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with regulation. Governance is rule-making by the owners or participants with a view of safeguarding 
their own interests. Regulation is rule-making, typically by an outside authority, with the view of 
representing the public interest. By consent, however, regulation may take place by means of contract 
or any other consensual organisational mechanism, in which case the line between governance and 
regulation may be blurred. 
 
Existing legal rules governing payment clearing and settlement have been drafted to 
accommodate the existing architecture of the system, and hence require adaptation to cover a DLT 
arrangement. By itself, this is a costly operation. The challenge, however, is to distinguish between 
those costs that once incurred will lead to a positive change and savings, and those that are effectively 
inherent in what will amount to a bad substitute to the traditional system. Moreover, in relation to a 
virtual currency of self-anchored value174 payable over a blockchain, such as Bitcoin, a preliminary 
legal question arises as to whether it is even ‘money’ in terms of being lawfully usable to discharge a 
debt, as well as to meet statutory requirements addressing ‘money’. Taking into account the 
fluctuating value of a self-anchored currency, an additional challenge is how to provide for a legal 
framework facilitating price stability, e.g. by rebasing the amount of money, that is, adjusting the 
number of cryptocurrency units in every digital wallet.175 
 
The decentralized basis of a DLT provides a challenge to governance, particularly in a 
‘permissionless’ DLT arrangement (where the ledger is ownerless). It is a misconception to think 
of such arrangements as existing independent of human rule-making. This is so because technical 
rules must be produced and maintained. Unforeseen circumstances are unavoidable, and the 
power of core developers may be in conflict with the will of the community. For ‘permissioned’ 
DLT arrangements (which there is an owner for the ledger),176 governance is simpler because by 
definition there is a proprietor. Compared with both permissioned DLT arrangements as well as 
traditional payment systems, governance costs in permissionless DLT arrangements are bound to 
be higher because of the greater complexity of the technical arrangement, the sheer greater 
number of participants directly involved and the difficulty of getting a timely agreement. This 
can be seen from the drawn-out process and uncertainty in terms of responsibility and ‘chain of 
command’ involved in occurrences such as: 
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• scaling the size of the blocks in Bitcoin (so as to alleviate the fear that a backlog of transactions 
awaiting inclusion in future blocks will clog up the Bitcoin network should blocks become 
consistently full);177 
• the delays in addressing the known issues in Ethereum that led to the DAO exploit (under which a 
hacker exploited the design of the DAO and appropriated more or less US$50m worth of ether);178 
and 
• the Ethereum flash crash (in which the value of the currency crashed within seconds from 
~US$320 to as low as US$0.10 as a result of someone placing a multi-million-dollar sell order at 
market price).179 
Regulatory legal considerations are numerous: 
• There is a legal need to provide for the reliability and authoritativeness of the records on the 
distributed ledgers. 
• Property rights in digital tokens representing physical assets as well as the liabilities and rights of 
parties transacting over them must be clearly defined and elaborated by law. As things stand now, 
there is not even a standard satisfactory definition as to what constitutes a digital asset, not to 
mention an elaboration of its relationship to the physical asset it represents. 
• As new mechanisms (such as smart contracts) are created and adopted in payment and clearing 
systems, a satisfactory legal framework must be established to govern them at an equally rapid 
pace. 
• A DLT arrangement generates new services and hence involves new players as intermediaries or 
otherwise providers of such services. This means licensing schemes, and possibly market conduct 
rules, including those applicable to Initial Coin Offerings, must be devised with a view to 
achieving, maintaining and improving both financial stability and protection of the public. 
• To date, such arrangements have mirrored the existing structures — e.g. a Bitcoin Automated 
teller machine (ATM) parallels traditional ones, etc. However, it has not been validated that (or 
which) existing laws and rules apply, as is evident from the various treatments of virtual 
currencies — as property by the US Internal Revenue Service, a commodity by the US 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and as a currency (for VAT purposes) by the European 
Court of Justice. 
• Settlement finality issues must be satisfactorily resolved. Settlement finality was defined to mean 
“the legally defined moment at which the transfer of an asset or financial instrument, or the 
discharge of an obligation is irrevocable and unconditional and not susceptible to being unwound 
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following the bankruptcy or insolvency of a participant”.180 It is essential for the efficient 
operation of a payment clearing and settlement system. Indeed, blockchain systems are designed 
to prevent the ‘double spending’ of a ‘coin’ so as to ensure that payment will be carried out only 
with available funds. In a DLT arrangement, however, the process of settlement may not be short 
or even of an exact or predictable duration, and the point of finality may not be easily identifiable. 
In the proof-of-work model, the first updating instance merely signals the beginning of the process 
of ledger synchronisation leading to the achievement of consensus across the nodes. Hence, 
subsequent models (consensus, proof of stake) are being examined to address the technical 
considerations of, for example, defined service-level agreements to achieve final consensus. 
• More complexity is introduced via Delivery vs. Payment (DVP) or Payment vs. Payment (PVP) 
systems. Furthermore, a DLT arrangement legal framework may neither provide for nor even 
address legal settlement finality. Indeed, settlement issues become even more complex when 
assets off the chain or off-chain transactions are considered. 
• The payment systems must comply with secrecy, anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist 
financing requirements. All of these are costlier in the distributed (no governing jurisdiction) and 
permissionless (no identifiable responsible party) environments. In fact, decentralization further 
challenges traditional methods of the enforcement of a judgment as well as of a security interest 
as, without the cooperation of the owner of an asset placed on the blockchain, the asset may not be 
accessible. 
• Certain issues existing in relation to electronic funds transfers appear in a modified form in 
payment over a blockchain, such as mistaken as well as unauthorized payments. Particularly acute 
is the loss of hardware or password resulting in loss of money or monetary value. Unlike in a 
traditional payment system, there is no funds holder intermediating in the payment transaction, or 
in fact any accountable intermediary involved in the process of payment, which could potentially 
absorb losses and distribute the costs or assist in the recovery of losses. 
• Last and certainly not least, numerous questions arise regarding ‘conflict of laws’. Such questions 
relate to jurisdiction as well as to the selection of law that will apply to private arrangements. This 
is particularly notable in light of the inherent ambiguities in pointing at the location of a 
contract/transaction, the blockchain and the money or monetary value itself. 
Regulatory arrangements are partly set by the authorities and partly by contract or otherwise by 
autonomous industry bodies. Contractual or other private arrangements require negotiations and 
agreement — activities in which costs are incurred. Compliance with regulatory arrangements, of 
whatever source, is costly. Intuitively, the mere decentralised nature of the blockchain arrangement, 
not to speak of its novelty as outlined above, is likely to increase compliance costs. Novelty and lack 
of precedents are certain sources of higher dispute resolution costs including litigation costs.181  
 
Globalization is enhanced by the cross-border scope of DLT in general and blockchain 
technology in particular. At the same time, law-making has not caught up with globalization. As such, 
there is a good chance that jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction law-making will be neither uniform nor even 
harmonious. The segmentation will increase disputes involving conflict of laws, as outlined above; 
therefore it is also bound to increase regulatory compliance costs. To meet the needs arising in such an 
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environment, regulatory technology (RegTech) solutions are being offered with claims to achieving 
significant reduction in costs.182 It may be too early to assess and quantify the value generated by such 
solutions. 
 
At present, any claim to legal cost reduction in a blockchain environment remains unproven. 
Moreover, it seems that RegTech solutions will work equally well for traditional payment systems, so 
that any alleged competitive advantage they give to blockchain technological solutions remains 
tenuous. In the final analysis, legal costs will not be the dominant factor for blockchain technological 
solutions for payment and settlement systems. Issues raised in the course of globalisation, such as 
segmented regulation, also exist for traditional payment systems, and in each case are to be met by 
greater harmonization of the law-making process. In the final analysis, once and wherever a strong 
business case is made for the adoption of blockchain technological solutions, the chance is that legal 
requirements designed to make adoption possible will be worked out whatever their cost may be. The 
burden of legal costs may make a difference only in solutions with a marginal business case that do 
not have the margin to absorb even small variations. 
 
It is argued that developers of cryptocurrencies "simply migrated the cryptographic tools 
used to safeguard communication and applied them to safeguard digital currency".183 Hence the 
vulnerability to erosive cryptographic intractability from which Bitcoin suffers, in addition to its  
vulnerability to leadership corruption.184 Also, its operation, whether in facilitating payments, 
preventing double spending, or issuing new bitcoins, requires substantial computational energy 
and is thus said to be wasteful.185 Bitcoin also suffers from poor scalability, as it can handle at 
most 7 transactions per second,186 compared to Visa and Mastercard that clear in a second 2,000 
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transactions,187 or even a peak-volume of 10,000 transactions per second.188  
 
            Certainly, however, Bitcoin is driven not only by technological innovation but also by 
strong sentiments189 against currency systems based on bank credit190 and backed by 
government.191 Its promoters cite its non-inflationary basis,192 partly attributed to the limitation 
on the number of bitcoins to be generated by its protocol; yet they overlook that, in the long run, 
the finite number of bitcoins in existence may prove to adversely affect both prices and 
liquidity193, not to mention that the current 21 million cap is not engraved in stone and is thus 
subject to change.194 Nevertheless, in the final analysis, Bitcoin’s principal weakness lies in the 
inherent instability in its value,195 due to its being a self-anchored digital currency. In the absence 
of any “objective rational[e] for any exchange value” Bitcoin is thus likened to “a game that 
triggered universal interest … [but whose] infirmity is as intrinsic as Monopoly money.” 
Furthermore, a competitor’s self-anchored math-based currency may emerge and thereby lower 
the Bitcoin value. This casts a shadow on the acceptability of Bitcoin as a real substitute to fiat 
currency.196 It has specifically been suggested that, to meet this drawback, Bitcoin should be 
pegged in one way or another to the value of a specific fiat currency or commodity,197 albeit at a 
heavy ideological cost to its promoters, who prefer to highlight its lack of dependence on 
anything of that sort. 
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 Decentralization and the resulting absence of a trusted central counterparty may however 
be more of a curse than a blessing.198 According to Saifeadean Ammous, inefficiency is inherent 
in the blockchain technology in general and Bitcoin in particular:199  
 
Bitcoin has a blockchain not because it allows for faster cheaper transactions, but 
because it removes the need to trust in third party intermediation: transactions are 
cleared because nodes compete to verify them, yet no node needs to be trusted. It 
is unworkable for third party intermediaries to imagine they could improve their 
performance by employing a technology that sacrifices efficiency and speed 
precisely to remove third party intermediaries. For any currency controlled by a 
central party, it will always be more efficient to record transactions centrally. 
Whether removing third party intermediation is a strong enough advantage to 
justify the increased inefficiency of distributed ledgers is a question that can only 
be answered over the coming years in the test of market acceptance of digital 
currencies. What can be clearly seen is that blockchain payment applications will 
have to be with the blockchain’s own decentralized currency, and not with 
centrally-controlled currencies. 
Elsewhere Ammous explains that it is the high processing power threshold which 
prevents both hacking and the establishment of a central control. Both achievements secure 
neutrality and full benefit of decentral structure for Bitcoin, and yet at the cost of a fixed supply 
of growth that cannot be made to adjust to satisfy a purely market-determined demand and hence 
results in price instability. At the same time, he observes, attempts in other currencies to bypass 
the expensive, inefficient and wasteful Proof of Work (PoW), by other settlement mechanisms 
such as Proof of Stake,200 consensus, or a trusted notary, compromise the neutrality of the 
system, enhance the control of the issuer, and/or require a third party verificator, all at the 
expense of the DLT premises. Hence, he concludes, Bitcoin could be no more than a store of 
value,201 while other cryptocurrencies cannot fulfill any monetary feature.202   
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The technology developed by Ripple is an example for both the price of abandoning PoW 
as well the lack of monetary feature of its currency. Thus, in Ripple, non-correspondent payer’s 
and payee’s banks can settle a payment made in a fiat currency. They use distributed financial 
technology to replace a trusted third bank and settle with each other through a ‘connector’, the 
latter being any entity that has accounts on the books of both. The two banks use distributed 
financial technology to coordinate account entries involving the connector’s accounts on each of 
their own respective books. Specifically, the payer’s bank would increase the balance it owes to 
the connector and, at the same time, the payee’s bank would decrease the balance it owes to the 
connector. The two banks would use distributed financial technology to communicate, 
coordinate, validate, and record their credit and debit to the connector’s accounts.203 Effectively, 
while weaving all participants into a comprehensive network rather than tying their distinct 
systems, Ripple has nevertheless not removed intermediation; in addition to reliance on 
connectors, the operation of the transfer thereunder is premised on a distributed ledger 
maintained by Ripple Lab, whose operation is not premised on PoW calculations. For its part, 
Ripple’s own native currency XRP is issued from a distributed protocol and yet unlike Bitcoin, is 
"pre-minted";204 it is centrally controlled and while it can be used in international payments205 it 
may be “better understood as a token for using the Ripple network, not as a currency of its own 
right” 206  
 
Ammous does not see the deflationary nature of Bitcoin as an impediment to its unit of 
account function. At the same time, having highlighted Bitcoin’s inadequacy to serve as a 
medium of exchange for everyday transactions, he argues in a forthcoming book that Bitcoin 
may be “the best store of value humanity ever invented” so as to be capable of functioning as “a 
reserve currency” to be held by banks in cold storage.207 Against it they will perform payment 
transactions by debiting payers’ accounts and crediting those of payees. With it they will settle. 
Other than eliminating the central bank, this model will mimic the role of banks in relation to 
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payments in fiat currencies so that everyday Bitcoin transactions will be carried out 'off-chain' in 
effect through banks or similar deposit taking institutions. In any event, the system envisaged by 
Ammous eliminates the central bank and its role as a lender of last resort as well more in general 
in relation to monetary policy. This is not the place to discuss the merits and demerits of such a 
proposed system. For our purposes suffice it to predict that in the current environment it will be a 
hard sell to policy makers, politicians, and the public at large.208 
 
A few central bank cryptocurrency schemes have been floating.209 In the US, proposals 
have been made for Fedcoin, being a central bank-issued centrally created cryptocurrency, to be 
available to the public at large.210 Digital coins are to be centrally issued on a blockchain-style 
decentralized ledger, but nevertheless with the central bank being in full control of quantity, 
timing, and fixed value in denominations of the national fiat currency unit of account. 
Effectively, transactions will be validated by an independent notary nominated by the central 
bank. So far as I know no detailed scheme has been flashed out. A similar proposal was made in 
the UK for RSCoin.211 Another proposal is for a NationCoin, being a Regulated and Sovereign 
Backed Cryptocurrency (RSBC). The scheme envisages cryptocoins, which as in Bitcoin, will be 
created by and transacted over a blockchain. However, upon their creation, cryptocoins will be 
stored, and released to the public by a Digital Asset Reserve, as RSBC, at the fixed value of the 
national unit of account. Transactions are to be verified by ‘miners’ who will be paid freshly 
minted cryptocoins.212  
 
In assessing such proposals, I have still to be persuaded that a DLT settlement is superior 
to a centralized one as discussed in the ensuing Section for claim-check centralized digital 
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currencies. 
Even as NationCoin envisages access for the public at large, its decentralized ledger is 
classified as permissioned. At the same time, with respect to the blockchain, neither different 
considerations apply, nor other results emerge, upon moving away from unpermissoned ledgers, 
open to the public, such as Bitcoin, to a permissioned one, open only to a selected group.213 This 
is demonstrated by the experimentation as a proof of concept (PoC) in Canada under the Jasper 
Project214 as well as in Singapore under the Ubin Project.215     
 By definition, a central bank digital currency ought to be issued centrally, even if 
payments in it are to be settled de-centrally; in short, a central bank cryptocurrency must be 
hybrid.216  Each of the two projects involves interbank settlement in central bank money and is 
characterized as a proof of concept of a DLT-based wholesale payment system. Thereunder, a 
central bank issues a ‘currency’ against some of its assets. More specifically, in a DLT-based 
wholesale payment system, the central bank issues to each participating bank digital depository 
receipts against the security of funds withdrawn from the reserve account of that bank. For each 
payment order processed, interbank settlement continuously takes place by transacting with these 
digital receipts over the blockchain. 
 In Jasper, Digital Depository Receipts (DDRs) issued by the Bank of Canada are secured 
by an omnibus account in which each participating bank deposits central bank money withdrawn 
from its settlement account. In Ubin, Depository Receipts (DRs) are issued by the Monetary 
Authority to each participating bank against central bank money deposited by the latter in an 
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individual cash custody account held with the former.217 In Ubin participating banks may hold 
deposit receipt balances on the blockchain overnight and have greater flexibility in pledging and 
redeeming DRs during operating hours. In Jasper DDRs are created and destroyed upon 
redemption on a daily basis.  
 Ubin uses a system built on the Ethereum platform. This was true for the first phase of 
Jasper (Jasper 1). This platform uses Proof of Work (PoW) consensus protocol, requiring 
expensive computations to validate transactions and update the ledger.218 For that reason the 
second phase of Jasper (Jasper II) switched to the Corda platform in which a notary function 
replaces that of the PoW: 
A key feature of Corda is that updates to the ledger are achieved through two 
functions: a validation function and a uniqueness function. The validation 
function, performed by the parties involved in the transaction, ensures that all 
details of the transaction are correct and that the sender has the required funds. 
The uniqueness function is performed by a notary.219 
 
The notary role in Jasper II is assigned to the Bank of Canada. As such it has access to the entire 
ledger and is able to verify that the funds involved in a transaction are available. 
 
 Since the validation of each transaction in Corda is exclusively a matter for its parties this 
platform is advantageous also from the confidentiality perspective. However, this feature is 
achieved at a cost, in the form of having a single point of failure, a drawback which is reinforced 
in Jasper II by assigning the notary role to one institution, i.e. the Bank of Canada.220   
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 Jasper II improved on both Jasper 1 and Ubin in facilitating a liquidity-saving mechanism 
(LSM) in the form of a payment queue with periodic multilateral payment netting for payments 
designated as ‘non-urgent’. 
  In the final analysis both Jasper and Ubin have been successful as a proof of concept for 
a DLT-based interbank settlement system that has the potential of replacing the traditional Real-
time Gross Settlement (RTGS). However, in assessing Jasper, it was concluded that: 221 
• For critical financial market infrastructures, such as wholesale payment systems, current 
versions of DLT may not provide an overall net benefit relative to current centralized 
systems. Recent versions of DLT have, however, made advances compared with initial 
cryptocurrency applications of DLT. 
 
• Benefits for the financial system of a DLT-based wholesale payment system could likely 
arise from its interaction with a larger DLT ecosystem of financial market infrastructures, 
potentially including cross-border transactions 
 It is interesting to speculate whether inter-customer settlement could be worked on a 
blockchain. The logistical difficulties appear to be more formidable than those existing to an 
interbank settlement as in Jasper and Ubin. This is so if only because of the larger number of 
participants and the less predictable volume, value, and frequency of payments. But even if 
logistics are resolved the fundamental deficiencies of the blockchain settlement remain a 
hindrance.  
Indeed, the promise of the blockchain is in bypassing intermediaries. However, this 
occurs at a cost,222 e.g. the need for PoW or a notary, the latter being a central bank, commercial 
bank, or anybody else. This is on the top of legal and technological uncertainties to be overcome.  
At the same time, a distinctive feature is that of transparency that may not present in a 
centralized system. Furthermore, it is said that DLT developments have been occurring at an 
accelerated pace;223 DLT functionality does not stand still and DLT flaws are constantly 
addressed. Arguably, DLT potential has not been exhausted, so that whether in the future 
enhanced technology will provide the required benefits so as to encourage a move towards a 
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DLT-based settlement system is a matter of speculation. However, in an environment of ongoing 
improvements in legacy systems DLT faces an uphill battle which it may not win.224 
Thus, at the moment, each country keeps upgrading its own legacy system. The fast 
payment model225 is a case to the point. Progress has also been made in global funds transfers.  
Thus, with the advent of enhanced technologies, thought has been given to the synchronization 
of a multi-leg funds transfer. This is to be carried out by earmarking liquidity for each leg in 
advance so as to facilitate an uninterrupted continuous execution of all payment orders, e.g. from 
an originating bank to its foreign correspondent and onward to the beneficiary’s bank.226 
For its part, SWIFT launched overlay services that leverage its global payments 
innovation (‘gpi) platform to facilitate seamless fast payments of which operation is premised on 
tightening up procedures, and yet with minimal changes to processing, that is, with a thin 
technology overlay. For now, this platform is available for the serial and not cover method for 
the transfer of funds.227 Principal features can be outlined as follows:228  
1. All the banks in the chain agree (and are required by the rulebook) to complete processing 
"quickly" (hours) so that end to end is done within a day. 
 
2. At every step of the way agents (banks) send the update to the SWIFT tracker so that it is 
always possible to know where the transaction is. 
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3. Even when dipping out of SWIFT (e.g. SWIFT -> Fed -> SWIFT), the Universally Unique 
Identifier (UUID) is preserved and the bank that sends to the Fed and the bank that receives 
from the Fed notify the tracker, so that information is complete. 
In order to enhance cross-border payments, SWIFT has created a new service level 
agreement (SLA) rulebook facilitating enhanced business practices and smart collaboration 
between participating banks. To monitor adherence to this new SLA for all members, SWIFT has 
created a central service called the Observer. All gpi banks will have a global view of other gpi 
banks’ adherence to the SLA. This will enable gpi banks to quickly pinpoint potential areas for 
improvement and work collaboratively towards a better implementation of the SLA. 
This is a three-stage project. The first phase of SWIFT gpi enables faster, same day use of 
funds (within the time zone of the receiving gpi member) and unaltered transfer of remittance 
information, which provides transparency of fees and end-to-end payments tracking. The second 
phase is designed to allow banks to transmit rich payment data as well as to immediately stop a 
payment, no matter where it is in the correspondence and to further increase the straight-through-
processing rate of cross-border payments, at origination. 
Indeed, against the background of these tangible achievements, SWIFT gpi is plunging 
towards the unknown. Thus, for its third phase, SWIFT gpi has already started exploring the 
potential of using new technologies such as DLT albeit solely in order to reconcile banks’ nostro 
accounts held in foreign currency with a correspondent bank in real-time (and not for the 
settlement of payments). Regardless of whether this stage will be successful, it is unclear how it 
will be an improvement by reference to the two earlier stages as well as how it will fit the 
otherwise centralized nature of a legacy system.  
The ultimate success of SWIFT gpi or any similar system depends on expanding its 
functionality by being transformed from a purely interbank system into a comprehensive system 
integrating within it internal bank systems. So far this may have been accomplished by Ripple 
blockchain229 – albeit among a small exclusive group of elite global banks, something that 
appears to be however within the reach of SWIFT gpi as well. The real challenge for SWIFT gpi 
is to encompass in such an integrative global system all members, something which Ripple 
blockchain is not necessarily better positioned to do.    
DLT technologies could still be considered in connection with banking operations for 
multi-leg international remittances230 as well as interledger international transfers.231 The latter 
have the potential of reconciling the accounts of customers of two banks even before the 
completion of the interbank settlement. However, in light of the above-mentioned SWIFT gpi 
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developments, and as long as DLT transactions move slowly and are not efficient – the 
advantage may be neither significant nor everlasting.   
(iv)  Claim-check centralized digital currencies 
 In expressing a clear preference to an account-based CBDC over tokens CBDC Bordo 
and Levin presupposed that the use of tokens requires blockchain settlement and that tokens 
cannot earn interest. They also asserted that the cost for verification for a token-based system 
would be inherently expensive.232  However, interest can be added to tokens when they are 
redeemed.233  Furthermore, as will be seen below, neither costly transfer, nor cumbersome 
procedure, nor blockchain settlement are essential ingredients of a claim-check tokenized 
system.  
Thus, payments by means of claim-check centralized digital currencies, whether virtual 
or CBDC, made directly between wallets accessed from one digital or mobile device to another 
and not through accounts, raise another set of challenges for banks. This can be demonstrated by 
the operation of a couple of available technologies. Both are centralized and have high 
scalability. Each of them bypasses physical delivery of cash to ATMs as well as to bank 
branches and of course in payment for goods and services. Their method of distribution to the 
public will however mimic the current system of physical delivery. Thus, banks will hold 
inventories of digital coins; they will get them by buying them from the issuer, e.g. by having 
their accounts with the issuer, the central bank in the case of CBDC, debited. Similarly, bank 
customers will ‘buy’ them from their respective banks usually by having their respective 
accounts debited. Customers could thus withdraw and deposit digital cash to their bank accounts 
exactly as they do so with banknotes; of course, upon such deposits, customers replace 
ownership in digital coins for a claim against their bank for funds on deposit. While holding 
digital coins, customers will have them on their wallets and could pay from wallet to wallet 
without going through bank accounts. Of course, customers may also deliver their digital coins 
for true safe keeping with institutions that will provide such services.  
The first available technology to be addressed is that of WingCash.  It is a centralized 
system under which a claim-check to fiat currency may be issued.234 It is a multi-issuer platform 
that allows the issuer to determine the reserve requirement. Claims to fiat currencies issued by 
commercial banks may be issued against a balance in a bank account at 1:1 ratio. ‘Brand value’ 
issued by businesses can be closed-loop and is usually not backed by value in a commercial 
account.  
            
Each claim-check is in the form of a unique web page with an immutably assigned web 
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address (URL), typically cryptographically signed by the issuer. It is described as a digital bearer 
instrument which simulates a physical banknote.  Once denominated, the value of the note does 
not change. Consequently, a $1 note can be exchanged for four $.25 notes. As well, each digital 
bearer instrument has a single ‘possession’ attribute so that only the current holder can reassign 
‘possession’ to another entity. The ledger immediately records the update to the ‘possession’ 
attribute to avoid the double-spending problem. As in the case of physical cash, the change of 
possession from one holder to another constitutes a payment. Therefore, the ledger keeps a 
record of the change of ‘possession’ of each bearer instrument. Digital notes may be redeemed to 
fiat currency in the form of either physical cash or bank money.  
 
Each web-page has certainly unique and separate identity so as to be dealt with as a 
digital coin. The architectural design of the WingCash platform uses a centralized model, 
allowing for the ledger to replicate in multiple locations. This offers both redundancy and 
scalability. One purpose of this feature is to allow for failover. If there is a failure in one 
location, traffic will automatically be routed to another location. It also helps to facilitate access 
and speed.  
 
The United States Federal Reserve established in 2015 a 331-member Faster Payments 
Task Force to support a broader effort to improve the speed, safety, and efficiency of 
payments.235 On March 29, 2016 McKinsey & Company was selected to support Faster 
Payments Task Force efforts to assess faster payments solution proposals from various providers 
across the United States payments industry.236 Among the 17 faster payments solutions, 
WingCash came tied in the first place.237  Its proposal is described as:   
 
A software platform that would be owned and operated by the Federal Reserve 
and the Governing Organization.238 The Federal Reserve would issue digital 
currency (digital Fed notes) and is tied to the Internet domain (Fednotes.com). 
 
This faster payment solution proposal “seek[s] to make it possible for any entity to transfer value 
electronically using methods that seek to preserve and to emulate physical currency.” 
Accordingly, its Faster Payments Network (FPN) will allow “persons and businesses to hold and 
transfer digital Fed notes for payment, with the direction of payment flow from the Payer directly 
to the Payee.” Thus, 239 
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… the FPN specifies a single Internet domain … where the Federal Reserve 
publishes digital bills and coins (Fed notes). Each Fed note is a unique web page 
with an immutably assigned URL that includes both a currency code (e.g., USD) 
and a unique identifier similar to a serial number… Combined these components 
form a unique immutable address for each Fed note …  
 
The Fed notes would constitute ‘legal tender’ so as to be the equivalent of US physical currency. 
“[E]ach Fed note is assigned a single, permanent, monetary unit of value “… as well as “a field 
that stores the URL of the issuer … and a field that stores the URL of the current holder….” 
Each Fed note would be cryptographically ‘signed’ by the ‘Fed’ using ‘asymmetric (public key) 
cryptography’ (PKC), with the Fed also acting as the Certificate Authority (CA). Fed notes are to 
be transferred by means of an exchange of cryptographically ‘signed’ messages from the payer to 
the Fed, (with a copy to the payee) followed by a message from the Fed to the payee. With the 
completion of each payment, the FPN updates the possession of attribute of the Fed note from 
the payer to the payee.  In the process, the Fed thus acts not only as the issuer but also as a 
controller of the Internet domain associated with each Fed note and custodian of the transfer 
record.  
 
The WingCash proposed solution envisages the use by the Fed of the WingCash 
platform. It is a platform that allow a safe and secure transfer of value among individuals and 
businesses. The Network has two distinct parts: one allowing Treasury to design and issue digital 
Fed notes. The second is to be operated by the Fed (either directly or through a Governing 
Organization), and consist of a global directory service distributing the digital notes and records 
their transfer. Initial distribution is to be made by the Fed to banks which will make the digital 
notes available for withdrawals to their customers. Both successful competition and 
interoperability with existing networks such as ACH and cards is anticipated.240   
 
            If Bitcoin is the epitome of a decentralized, self-anchored, speculative, and unstable 
cryptocurrency, then BitMint, the second technology to be addressed, stands on the other end of 
the digital currencies spectrum, facilitating, among other features, a centralized scheme for a  
non-speculative and stable currency, consisting of randomized coins, each expressing a claim-
check to a defined quantity of a specific commodity, including a fiat currency.241 BitMint keeps 
100% reserve so that the purchasing commodity or fiat currency is always available for 
redemption on demand. Its functionality not only overlaps with that of Bitcoin but also exceeds 
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it. BitMint is thus said to be identified as “the only candidate qualifying as a universal digital 
representation of worldwide currencies.”242  
 
            BitMint is leading a grand vision for the future of money as both a specific money 
protocol and a generic money framework. The value of its currency is non-speculative. It is 
protected by quantum physics, not dependent on erosive encryption, and claimed to be 
indefeasible by cyber threats. Facilitating private issuance of the currency, BitMint envisions its 
redemption at a central mint by the fiat currency or commodity by which it is fully backed. It is 
also suitable as a digitized central bank currency.243 While it is a centralized system, BitMint 
includes a Validation Hierarchy under which BitMint coins are validated through subordinate 
nodes.  
 
            BitMint may be tethered.244 ‘Tethered money’ is defined to mean “[m]oney with built-in 
limitation on its use.”245 Paper-based travelers’ checks, available for use only by their 
purchasers,246 are an example to paper-based tethered currency.247 Coupons available for use in 
limited locations or at designated businesses are another example of tethered paper currency. 
Scriptural central bank money may also be tethered by setting limitations and restrictions to its 
use. Tethering, however, is hard to achieve for bank money, since it requires ongoing 
involvement of the payer in the distribution of funds by the payee. In any event, tethering is 
unavailable for central bank physical currency. At the same time, tethering is in principle 
extensively available for digital currency. 
 
            Tethering is an important tool for budgeting, gifting and grant giving, as it releases the 
payer from the heavy burden of monitoring and overseeing the actual use of the money in 
compliance with the terms under which it was paid. It thus eliminates both waste and corruption. 
A few examples may be helpful. A lender providing a car loan can tether the money so that the 
borrower can use it only in payment to any or a specific car dealer. A donor may tether the 
donation so that the recipient will be able to use the money only for the purpose of the donation. 
An individual paying a spouse for the support of their children can tether the money so that it 
will be usable only for that purpose. Treasury may allocate funds and provide them tethered for 
the purpose allocated under the budget or grant.248  
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            Tethering may designate a redeemer of the digital coin, e.g. an officer of a given 
corporation or a resident in a small city. The latter case may be through a local or community 
money scheme under which tax or other benefits are given to support economic activity in the 
locality or community. Alternatively, money given as a construction loan may be limited for 
redemption only by qualified contractors to ensure that the borrower is not spending the money 
to go on vacation. In the further alternative, tethered money may be redeemable from date certain 
to date certain. A renter could use such coins to pay his or her rent a year ahead and specify, for 
each coin, the next month as the window of redemption for that coin. Similarly, money can be 
tethered to be payable only upon (or, alternatively, before) the occurrence of a specified event. 
 
            As an option, a digital coin may be set for redemption only if it carries with it its entire 
history. In fact, the sky is the limit: money can be tethered with anything, that is, with any 
restriction or limitation to its use that can algorithmically be checked and verified with no 
ambiguity is a bona fide term of payment. 
 
            To that end, tethering is available as a means of protection for digital money on hand. 
Thus, even where ‘storage’ is successfully hacked, digital coins cryptographically linked to the 
rightful owner will not be redeemable by the thief or anyone deriving title from the thief.249 
Indeed, when paid with digital coins and for their own protection, payees are well advised to 
consult the ‘oracle’ for the validity of the coins, including their availability to be payable to 
them, free of any tethering-driven limitation. At least to the extent that digital currency is 
‘money’, which ought not to be an issue for digital currency lawfully issued by a central bank, 
misappropriated and untethered digital coins will pass to an innocent taker for value free of any 
adverse claim.250 As well, cryptographic storage is akin to bailment and, unlike the bank deposit, 
not a loan251 so as not to charge the custodian with absolute liability for loss caused by 
hacking.252 At the same time, to enhance protection, digital coins cryptographically stored at a 
bank could be ‘double-tethered’, both to the bank and the owner. 
 
BitMint may also be cascaded. Cascaded digital money is denominated in a unit of 
account anchored on the value of two or more fiat currencies, commodities, or indices, and used 
as agreed either bilaterally or multilaterally, particularly in macro and cross-border payments. It 
is envisioned to be a “dynamic competitive market carried out through a web of mints (the 
intermint) that will adhere to a binding protocol to allow for a smooth interchange on a global 
scale.”253 Each level of mints will create a currency that is a claim-check to a specific mix or 
                                                          
248
 Samid, ibid at 27 (basis of tethering), 33–68 (use and impact of tethering). 
 
249
 Samid, ibid at 50 and 100. 
 
250
 The classic case for this proposition is Miller v Race (1758), 1 Burr 452; 97 ER 398. 
 
251
 The classic case supporting the proposition that the bank deposit is a loan is Foley v Hill (1848), 2 HLC 28, 9 
E.R. 1002. 
 
252
 A classic case linking custodian responsibility to a duty of care is Coggs v Bernard (1703), 2 Ld Raym 909, 92 
E.R. 107. 
 
253
 Samid, supra 146 at 65. 
53 
 
cocktail of commodities and/or fiat currencies as ‘represented’ in the ‘combined’ currencies of 
lower level mints. As the cascade climbs up, it is expected to create “joint currencies that would 
increasingly represent the wealth of humanity in total”.254 It is predicted that this “will not kill 
fiat currencies, as they would serve as the bases for the cascaded currency, and the better 
managed each fiat currency, the higher would [raise] its share in the cascaded global 
currency.”255 
 
            Available tethering facilitates crypto-fusing contractual terms between payer to payee 
into the money, so as to disallow any use that is in breach of the contract. Available tethering 
further includes the option of making BitMint money accessible only to an identifiable holder. 
Obviously, this greatly enhances security and safety and reduces fraud. As well, the protocol 
may accommodate either a design under which the issue, every transfer and the redemption are 
recorded or a design where only the issue and redemption are recorded. Under the latter design, 
transfers between issue and redemption are not registered and remain anonymous. As discussed, 
the latter option nevertheless accommodates inquiries with the ‘oracle’ and does not preclude 
tethering. Furthermore, bypassing a centralized protocol operator does not inhibit law 
enforcement and combatting money laundering or anti-terrorism finance. For BitMint, being a 
centralized system, this is due to the issuer’s ability to list a suspect as non-compliant. 
 
            BitMint money is generated through an economical quantum mechanical 
process,256which is energy-efficient and reduces waste. Being not dependent on erosive 
cryptography, and instead expressed in a string consisting of sequences of bits that are totally and 
completely random and pattern-less, its coins are immune against brute force cracking as well as 
against hacking and quantum computing. In addition, BitMint money can be split off or 
amalgamated at any desired resolution, so that each digital coin is readily amenable to either split 
into smaller coins or amalgamate (with one or more coins) into a larger one, with each such a 
new coin being represented by a substring of the original coin(s).257 BitMint bit-string money can 
be paid continuously on a pay-as-you-go basis, e.g. as you pump gas into a car gas tank, rather 
than separately, e.g. upon the completion of the service. Available technologies also facilitate 
safe storage and speedy transfer by electronic means. Its currency/payment protocol enables 
direct payments between digital devices of payer and payee, and further facilitates both macro 
and micro payments in open and close loops, as well as in loyalty schemes.  
 
 In the final analysis, in the absence of intermediaries a payee receiving payment by 
means of a claim-check centralized digital currency may easily verify both the validity of the 
coin and the identity of the sender. Moreover, in the absence of receiving account information, a 
dishonest payee will find it difficult to misuse such information. Hence, assuming a continuous 
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process of technological enhancement, there are reasonable grounds to assume successful 
penetration of such currencies and the methods of payment with them.   
It is hard to predict to what extent payments in centralized digital currencies will 
superseded those intermediated through banks. Possibly, both practicalities and anti-money 
laundering & terrorist financing regulations may limit the size of payments made in claim-check 
centralized digital currencies, the latter being in some way analogous to cash payments, so as to 
make them more labour-intensive for payments of large sums. Furthermore, the chance is that for 
a large payment, an RTGS system, with liquidity-saving mechanisms, settled between 
commercial banks on the books of a trusted central bank, will be preferred by participants over a 
large peer to peer digital cash payment between them.258  
In any event, commercial banks may undertake several roles in an environment in which 
claim-check centralized digital currencies are widely spread. First, they could provide storage 
facilities for customers. In such a case their liability to customers will be as guardians or bailees; 
such liability depends on fault and is not absolute as that of a debtor on a bank deposit. On the 
top of this, commercial banks could offer competing terms for holding funds in accounts held by 
them in conjunction with offering payment services for claim-check centralized digital 
currencies that could be withdrawn from such accounts. Banks will be able to provide overdraft 
facilities in connection with accounts something which storage facilities for digital currencies 
will not be able to do. Second, commercial banks may act as issuers of virtual, particularly 
cascaded, digital currencies. Third, banks will remain capable of lending into accounts they 
maintain for customers and in any event may set the terms under which digital currencies will be 
withdrawn from such accounts particularly if they are directed to use for payment from a 
platform not controlled by the bank maintaining the account. The chance is that broad investment 
powers in relation to money on deposit, whether under a fractional or full reserve system, will 
allow banks to continue to benefit from combining deposit taking and the provision of payment 
services.   
IV. Conclusion 
 Born in Antiquity and reborn in the Middle Ages, each time as an extension of money 
changing, banking became a business combining deposit taking and lending. On and off banks 
have been linked to money creation but have always operated non-cash payment services. 
 Banking services emerged in Ancient Mesopotamia. The first banks appeared in Greece; 
they moved to Rome and were set up in Greco-Roman Egypt where the first bank network as 
well as the first national payment system, even if only in kind and not money, is recorded. Banks 
reappeared in West Europe in the late Middle Ages to take deposits, lend and provide payment 
services. However, in Medieval Europe, it was the merchant banker, and not the deposit taker, 
that gave rise to multilateral clearing and the clearing house. It was post-medieval England that 
in a gradual process, lasting into the early modern period, has produced the modern national 
banking network headed by the central bank. When the dust had settled, the scene crystalized to 
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consist of (i) a network of clearing commercial banks taking deposits, lending while creating 
money in the process, and providing payment services, side by side with (ii) a central bank 
issuing money in the form of banknotes and the maintenance of settlement accounts for banks, 
providing with lender of last resort facilities, as well as managing the quantity of money to 
ensure price stability throughout the national economy. 
 Money and payment digitization has brought some challenges to the traditional role of 
banks as intermediaries. First, the digital age is about to facilitate the availability of central bank 
money balances or their equivalent to the public. Second, cryptocurrencies and blockchains were 
born. Third, claim-check centralized digital currencies have been created. This paper argues that 
availability of central bank money, in the form of either full-reserve banking or plain sovereign 
money, is unlikely to affect the role of banks other than in money creation. They will remain 
deposit takers, lenders and providers of payment services. The paper goes on to argue that 
cryptocurrencies are mostly not a new form of money and that in essence blockchains do not 
pose a major threat to the traditional interbank settlement system; at most they spur 
improvements in legacy systems. Finally, the argument goes, the creation of claim-check 
centralized digital currencies will give banks enough space to continue their role in providing 
payment services and even create alternative currencies fully backed by fiat ones. In short, in the 
long run, to stay competitive, no model other than banking is available to IT firms entering the 
payment industry. Banking has not been mortally wounded by Fintech; rather, as the banking 
network has become ready to absorb IT firms transformed to banks, banking is alive and well.  
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